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1 Introduction
“The sheer number and complexity of instruments being used by platform owners, including invest-
ments, technology rules, information dissemination, contracting choices, and pricing, is an empirical
phenomenon deserving closer attention and clearer explanation” (Boudreau and Hagiu, (2009))
Motivation. When Apple launched its first iPhone in 2007, the market responded with hesita-
tion: developers were uncertain about the attractiveness for end-users of the phone’s touch-screen
feature, while end-users were uncertain about the potential for new applications. While subsequent
versions of the iPhone were received with more enthusiasm, most versions of Windows smart phones
have been received with hesitations.1
The launch of a new platform (e.g., a new smart-phone operating system, or a video-games
console) comes with uncertainty about the platform’s ability to attract agents from various sides
of the market.2 Because of such uncertainty, platforms invest considerable resources in information
management policies such as advertising campaigns, exhibitions, information disclosures, community
management, forums, showrooms, and blogs aimed at promoting on each side of the market the
platform’s ability to attract users from other sides. The importance of such policies, especially at the
early stages of a platform’s life, when communication and information management are key factors
for igniting the market, is well recognized by practitioners and market designers. It stems from
the fact that platforms recognize that potential users need to form beliefs about the participation
of other sides of the market and that such beliefs are typically based not only on information that
is publicly available but also on the agents’ own personal experience with the platform’s product
and services.3 Information management and pricing thus complement each other in improving the
coordination between the various sides of a market.
Perhaps surprisingly, such information management policies have received little attention in the
academic literature.4 The assumption commonly made in the analysis of platform markets is that
the distribution of preferences is common knowledge, so that each agent from each side can perfectly
predict the participation decisions of all other agents and such predictions coincide with the plat-
forms’. While such assumption simplifies the analysis, it does not square well with markets in which
the product, or service, offered by one, or multiple, platforms is relatively new. Importantly, such a
simplifying assumption precludes the analysis of how platforms invest in information management
to influence the agents’ beliefs and thereby their participation decisions.
1An issue faced by Microsoft in the smart-phone market has been the self-defeating nature of the agents’ expectations.
See, e.g., ”Microsoft Banks on Mobile Apps”, by Shira Ovide and Ian Sherr, April 5, 2012, The Wall-Street Journal.
2Uncertainty also plays a major role in the launch of new operating systems for personal computers. For example,
many of the Microsoft OS releases were received with hesitations from various sides of the market (e.g., Windows 3,
Windows 95, Windows 7).
3See, e.g., Evans and Schmalensee (2015).
4For an overview of the economics literature on platforms see, e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2006), Rysman (2009), and
Weyl (2010).
Contribution. In this paper, we develop a rich, yet flexible, framework that can be used to shed
light on the key trade-offs that platforms face when designing their information management policies.
We then use such a framework to investigate the effects of such policies on profits, consumer surplus,
and welfare. We address the following questions: (a) How is pricing affected by the uncertainty
that agents face about a platform’s ability to attract participation from other sides? (b) What are
the strategic implications of such uncertainty for the initial development of a platform, in particular
for its design decisions? (c) Which communication strategies can help managing expectations and
convince potential adopters of the likely take-off of a platform? In particular, which features of a
platform should be prominently released? (d) Should platforms commit to disclose to late adopters
about earlier participation decisions? (e) What are the effects of the above policies on consumer
surplus and welfare?
To answer the above questions, first, we study how uncertainty shapes the elasticity of the
demands and the equilibrium prices. We then investigate the platforms’ incentives to favor design
dimensions that appeal to both sides of the market (e.g., features of the operating system that
are likely to be appreciated by both end-users and app developers), as well as their incentives to
manage expectations through various information policies. Such policies include standard advertising
campaigns but also less conventional practices such as the promotion of forums, conferences, and
community architectural design that platforms use to help potential adopters predict participation
decisions on other sides of the market. Finally, we investigate the platforms’ incentives to disseminate
information about earlier participation decisions.
Key insights. Our first result shows that, when preferences are aligned across sides, dispersed
information weakens competition. This is because it reduces the elasticity of the demands on both
sides of the market by introducing positive correlation between the agents’ stand-alone valuations
(i.e., the direct utility the agents derive from the platforms’ products)5, and their estimated network
effects (i.e., the indirect utility the agents expect from interacting with agents from other sides of
the market).6 To illustrate, suppose that, on each side, agents with a higher stand-alone valuation
for a platform’s product expect, on average, a higher appreciation also by agents from the opposite
side. Then suppose that a platform were to raise its price on, say, side 1. Because the marginal agent
from side 1 who is excluded is the most ”pessimistic” about the side-2’s participation, among those
who would join the platform without the price change, the drop in the side-1’s demand expected by
the platform is smaller than in a market where all agents share the same beliefs about the side-2’s
participation (as is necessarily the case under complete information). In this case, the dispersion
5This direct utility may originate from the one-sided goods, or services, that the platform bundles with its two-sided
services (see e.g., Edelman (2015)), or from preassigned agents on the opposite side (e.g., vertically integrated suppliers,
as in Lee (2013), or marquee buyers, as in Rochet and Tirole, (2003)). Such direct utilities are also referred to in the
literature as ”intrinsic benefits” (e.g., Armstrong and Wright, (2007)), or ”membership benefits” (e.g., Weyl, (2010)).
6Other expressions favored in the literature are ”usage values” (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, (2006)), ”cross-side exter-
nalities” (e.g., Armstrong, (2006)), and ”interaction benefits” (e.g., Weyl, (2010)).
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of information reduces the own-price elasticity of the demand functions. Other things equal, such
reduced elasticity may contribute to higher prices on one side and lower prices on the opposite side.
However, in general, both the sum and the skewness of the equilibrium prices across sides are higher
under dispersed information than under complete information.
The above results have interesting implications for the effects on platforms’ profits, consumer
surplus, and welfare, of design and information management policies aimed at influencing the agents’
expectations about the participation of other sides. To investigate such implications, we distinguish
between pre-launch campaigns affecting the agents’ expectations about the other side’s participation
by acting primarily on the correlation between the agents’ appreciations for a platform’s product
and post-launch campaigns affecting the expectations of late adopters though the dissemination of
information about earlier participation decisions.
In the case of pre-launch campaigns, we show that aligning preferences across sides unambiguously
contributes to higher profits. In designing its features, a platform thus may gain more by focusing
on a niche in which agents from both sides share similar preferences than to aim at getting on board
a broader base of undifferentiated users on each side of the market. Moreover, when preferences are
aligned, platforms gain from pre-launch disclosures, the promotion of showrooms, trials, and other
disclosure policies that help agents use their own appreciation for a platform’s products to predict
participation decisions on the other side of the market.7 Unfortunately, such policies, while welfare
enhancing, may hurt consumers by increasing equilibrium prices more than they increase consumers’
gross surplus.
To study the effects of post-launch disclosures, we consider a dynamic extension in which agents
have the possibility of changing platform over time. We study the effects of post-launch campaigns
providing late adopters with information about earlier participation decisions. We show that while
such campaigns have a positive effect on welfare, they have ambiguous effects on profits. On the one
hand, by permitting the late adopters to learn about the true distribution of preferences through
the observation of the earlier participation decisions, such campaigns reduce the sensitivity of the
agents’ expectations about the other side’s participation to their own appreciation for the plat-
forms’ products. Because a lower sensitivity contributes to a higher price-elasticity of the demands,
through this channel, such campaigns contribute to lower profits. At the same time, by improving
the overall quality of the agents’ information, such campaigns also permit agents from different sides
to better coordinate on which platform to join. Better coordination softens ex-ante competition
by contributing to a higher ex-post differentiation between platforms. Hence, through this second
channel, post-launch disclosures contribute to higher profits. The net effect of such campaigns then
depends on which of the above two channels prevails. When preferences are drawn from a Gaussian
distribution, we show that the second channel tends to prevail, making post-launch disclosures prof-
itable. We also show that the effects of such post-launch disclosures on profits are strongest when
7See Godes & al. (2005) for a discussion of the role of social interactions in marketing and Haruvy and Prasad
(2005) and Gaudeul (2010) for the analysis of freewares and sharewares.
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preferences are sufficiently aligned and network effects are large.
In the Supplementary Material, we extend the analysis in a few directions. First, we contrast a
platform’s incentives to engage in design and information management in a covered duopoly market
to their counterparts in an uncovered monopolistic market. We find that, in general, the comparison
is ambiguous. However, in markets that are symmetric across sides, the effects of such policies on
monopoly profits are always smaller than in a duopoly market. In particular, in markets in which the
monopolist serves at least half of the market on each side, the aforementioned pre-launch disclosures
have negative effects on monopoly profits, while they have positive effects on duopoly profits. Second,
we discuss the robustness of the key insights to opt-outs and multi-homing. Third, we consider a
dynamic extension in which platforms change prices at the same frequency at which agents learn the
relative attractiveness of the two platforms. Lastly, we consider markets in which cross-side network
effects interact with within-side network effects.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We wrap up the Introduction with
a brief discussion of the contribution of the paper to the pertinent literature. Section 2 presents
the model. Section 3 introduces some benchmarks that facilitate the subsequent analysis. Section
4 characterizes demand functions and equilibrium prices under dispersed information. Section 5
contains all the implications for platform design, advertising, forums, blogs, post-launch disclosures,
and other information campaigns. Section 6 offers a few concluding remarks. All proofs are either
in the Appendix or in the paper’s Supplementary Material.
(Most) pertinent literature. Our model is the incomplete-information analog of the models
of differentiated platforms with homogenous network effects of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006),
and Armstrong (2006). Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl (2017) extend these models focusing on
the heterogeneity of network effects, respectively in a monopolistic market and in a duopoly (see
also Ambrus and Argenziano, 2009, for how heterogenous network effects can lead to asymmetric
networks), while Tan and Zhou (2017) extend these models by allowing for an arbitrary number of
platforms and for richer specifications of the within-side and cross-side network effects. These papers,
however, do not consider the possibility that preferences be correlated across sides, which is one of the
key forces behind the mechanism we consider in the present paper. We thus identify a new channel
by which the dispersion of information affects the elasticity of the demands on the two sides and
thereby the equilibrium prices. This in turn permits us to uncover novel effects. For example, under
complete information, it is the discrepancy between the importance assigned to network effects by
the marginal user and by the average user that is responsible for distortions in prices and in network
allocations, along the lines of those identified in Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976) — see Weyl
(2010). In contrast, under dispersed information, it is the discrepancy between the participation rates
expected by the marginal agent on each side and the participation rates expected by the platforms
that is responsible for novel distortions.
Our paper focuses on dispersed information at the subscription stage pertaining to preferences
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in the population. In contrast, Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013) examine optimal tariffs when agents
privately learn their valuations only after joining a platform but before transacting with the other
side. Hagiu and Halaburda (2014) focus on information about prices, showing that, unlike in the
monopoly case, in a duopoly market, platforms may prefer agents to remain uninformed about the
prices charged on the opposite side. While these papers address very different questions, they both
point to the importance of asymmetric information for platforms’ pricing decisions.
The paper also contributes to the literature on informative advertising and marketing campaigns.
The closest contributions are Anderson and Renault (2006, 2009) and Johnson and Myatt (2006)
(see also the references therein). These papers show that, in a one-sided market, information about
horizontal differences between products may reduce the intensity of competition by increasing product
differentiation, an effect that is present also in our model. However, we focus on novel effects that
are specific to two-sided platforms. In particular, we focus on campaigns that help agents predict
other agents’ preferences and behavior, which is new and brings novel implications. Johnson and
Myatt (2006) also analyze product design from the perspective of dispersion of demand, showing
that firms prefer extremal dispersion. Our contribution shows that this conclusion does not extend
to two-sided platforms.8
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on coordination under incomplete information, and
in particular the global-games literature.9 A difference though is that, in our work, the dispersion of
information is a central part of the phenomenon under examination, as opposed to a convenient tool
for equilibrium selection. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine a global
game in which two distinct populations (the two sides) coordinate under dispersed information and
where the outcome of such coordination is shaped by two competing ”big players” (the platforms).
The paper in this literature closest to ours is Argenziano (2008) which uses a global-game approach
to study one-sided network competition. The questions addressed in that paper relate to allocative
efficiency under product differentiation and differ from those addressed in the present paper which
are largely motivated by the two-sideness of the markets under examination.
2 Model
Players. Two platforms, indexed by k = A,B, compete on two sides, i = 1, 2. Each side is
populated by a measure-one continuum of agents, indexed by l ∈ [0, 1].
Actions and payoffs. Each agent l from each side i must choose which platform to join. The
8Veiga et al. (2017) study one-sided platform design focusing on the correlation between heterogeneous valuation
for quality and heterogeneous contribution to network effects. These features are absent in our model, which focuses
on consumers’ information and the correlation of valuations across sides.
9See, among others, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), and Morris and Shin (2003).
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payoff that each agent l from each side i derives from joining each platform k is given by
Ukil = v
k
il + γiq
k
j − pki
where vkil is the agent’s stand-alone valuation for platform k (think of this as the direct utility the
agent derives from the platform’s product, or service), qkj ∈ [0, 1] is the mass of agents from side
j 6= i that join the platform, γi ∈ R+ is a parameter that controls for the intensity of the network
effects on side i, and pki is the price (the access fee) charged by the platform to the side-i agents.
10
As in most of the literature, we abstract from price discrimination. By paying the fee pki , each agent
l from side i receives the platform’s product and/or is granted access to all agents joining the same
platform from the opposite side of the market. The payoff that each agent l from each side i obtains
from not joining any platform (that is, the agent’s outside option) is assumed to be equal to zero.
Each platform’s payoff is the total revenue collected from the two sides:11
Πk = pk1q
k
1 + p
k
2q
k
2 .
All players are risk-neutral expected-utility maximizers.
We focus on equilibria with full participation and single-homing. To illustrate the key ideas in
the simplest possible way, we then assume that each agent’s stand-alone valuations for the products
of the two platforms are given by
vAil = si −
vil
2
and vBil = si +
vil
2
all l ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2.
This specification is chosen so that the “type” of each agent is unidimensional and coincides with the
differential in stand-alone valuations vil ≡ vBil − vAil , i =, 1, 2, which measures the extent to which the
intrinsic characteristics of platform B (i.e. set aside expected network effects) are preferred to those
of platform A by an agent of type l in side i. The scalar si ∈ R, which we assume to be commonly
known to the platforms and to all agents, only serves the role of guaranteeing that full participation
is robust to the possibility that agents opt out of the market (see the analysis in the Supplementary
Material).
Illustrative example. To fix ideas, let the two platforms be two mobile software platforms, say
Apple and Google, or two video-game consoles, say Nintendo Wii and Microsoft X-box. Let the side-
1 agents be end-user consumers, and the side-2 agents be app, or, alternatively, game developers.
Interpret the end-users’ differentials in stand-alone valuations as the difference in utility derived
from the two software’s core functions (alternatively, from the two consoles’ build-in services and
10To ease the exposition, we assume positive network effects on both sides. All the results extend to markets in
which network effects are negative on one side (as in certain advertising models) provided that γ1 + γ2 > 0, which,
empirically, appears the most relevant case.
11All results extend to markets in which the platforms incur costs to get agents on-board and/or to provide the
agents with the auxiliary products/services they provide. Because these costs do not play any fundamental role, we
disregard them to facilitate the exposition.
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proprietary games). Then interpret the developers’ differentials as the differences in profit from
developing for one or the other platform.12 Such differences in profits in turn may originate in
differences in developing costs (due to the heterogeneity in the two codes), developer support, and
APIs, i.e., application programming interfaces. In this example, the price paid by the end-users to the
platforms should then be interpreted as the price for purchasing the hardware (e.g., the smartphone,
or the videogame console), while the price paid by the developers should be interpreted as the fee
asked by the platforms to place the app in the corresponding library.13
Beliefs. The distribution of the agents’ stand-alone valuations on the two sides of the market
(hereafter, “the aggregate state”) is unknown both to the platforms and to each agent. This is the
key point of departure from the rest of the literature. We assume each agent’s differential in stand-
alone valuations vil parametrizes both the agent’s preferences for the products/services of the two
platforms and the agent’s beliefs about the aggregate state, which in turn he uses to form beliefs
about the participation of the other side of the market. For simplicity, we assume that platforms
do not possess private information. This assumption permits us to abstract from the signaling role
of prices (and the associated multiplicity of equilibria), and focus instead on the novel effects that
come from the agents’ uncertainty about the participation of the other side of the market.
For any v ∈ R, i = 1, 2, we denote by QAi (v) the measure of agents from side i that platform A
expects to have a differential in stand-alone valuations no greater than v, and by QBi (v) the measure
of agents from side i that platform B expects to have a differential in stand-alone valuations no
smaller than v. As it will become clear in a moment, these functions also capture the participation
rates expected by the two platforms.14
We assume that each function Qki is strictly monotone and differentiable over the entire real line
and then denote by dQki (v)/dv its derivative.
Next, consider the agents. For any i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, any (vi, vj) ∈ R2, let Mji (vj |vi) denote
the measure of agents from side j with differential in stand-alone valuations no greater than vj ,
as expected by any agent from side i with differential in stand-alone valuations equal to vi. These
functions are thus the cumulative distribution functions of the agents’ marginal beliefs over the cross-
sectional distribution of differentials in stand-alone valuations on the other side of the market. In the
context of the motivating example introduced above, such functions capture heterogeneity in beliefs,
both among the end-users and the developers, about the platforms’ ability to attract participation
12We focus here on apps, or games, developed for a single platform. The case of apps developed for multiple platforms
corresponds to the case of “multihoming”, which we do not develop in this paper—see, however, the discussion in the
Supplement for the robustness of the main insights to multihoming.
13Apple, for example, charges currently $99 for placing an app in its App Store, whereas Google charges $25 to place
an app in its Google Play Console.
14These functions in turn can be related to the platforms’ beliefs over the distribution of valuations in the cross-
section of the population. Letting Ψki (v) denote the cumulative distribution function of platform k’s marginal beliefs
over the side-i cross-sectional distribution of differentials in stand-alone valuations, we have that QAi (v) =Ψ
A
i (v) and
QBi (v) = 1−ΨBi (v).
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from the other side of the market. For example, when applied to the consumers’ side, such functions
capture how end-user consumers use their own appreciation for the features of a new smartphone,
or a new video-game console, to form expectations about the development of new apps. Likewise,
when applied to the developers side, such functions capture how potential developers use available
information about a platform’s software characteristics (e.g., its interface) to predict the adoption
by end-users. Importantly, such beliefs need not coincide with the platforms’ own expectations.
Hereafter, we assume that, for any vi, Mji (vj |vi) is strictly increasing in vj , and differentiable in
each argument, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. As for the dependence of Mji (vj |vi) on vi, we will focus primarily
on two polar cases.
Definition 1. Preferences are aligned if, for all vj ∈ R, Mji (vj |vi) is decreasing in vi, i, j = 1, 2,
j 6= i. Conversely, preferences are misaligned if, for all vj ∈ R, Mji (vj |vi) is increasing in vi,
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
In markets in which preferences are aligned, agents with a higher appreciation for a platform’s
product or service also expect a higher appreciation by agents from the opposite side, whereas the
opposite is true in markets in which preferences are misaligned. In the context of our motivating
example, preferences are aligned when those end-users who are most enthusiastic about the new
smartphone’s operating system, or the new videogame console, are also those who are most optimistic
about the development of new apps and games for the new platform, and likewise those developers
who are most enthusiastic about the platform’s characteristics are also those who are most optimistic
about the platform’s ability to convince end-users to buy the new smartphone or the new console.
Importantly, note that the definition does not presume that stand-alone valuations be drawn
from a common prior. It simply establishes a monotone relationship between beliefs and stand-alone
valuations. Finally note that, while the above specification assumes that agents face uncertainty
about the aggregate distribution of stand-alone valuations for each of the two platforms’ products,
all the results extend to markets in which the stand-alone valuations for one of the two platforms’
product (say, an incumbent’s) are commonly known.
Common prior. As mentioned already, the above specification does not impose that the agents’
and the platforms’ beliefs be generated from a common prior. To see how the special case of a
common prior fits into the framework introduced above, it is convenient to think of the following
set-up. The aggregate state (that is, the cross-sectional joint distribution of stand-alone valuations
on the two sides of the market) is parametrized by θ ∈ Θ. All players believe that θ is drawn from
a distribution Fθ. In each state θ, each agent’s differential in stand-alone valuations, vil, is drawn
from a distribution Λθi , with density λ
θ
i (vi) , independently across agents, i = 1, 2, l ∈ [0, 1]. The
mass of agents from side i with valuation no greater than v in state θ is then equal to Λθi (vi) . In
this case, the platforms’ and the agents’ beliefs are given by
QAi (vi) = Eθ[Λθi (vi)], QBi (vi)=Eθ[1− Λθi (vi)], and Mji (vj |vi) =
Eθ[Λθj (vj)λθi (vi)]
Eθ[λθi (vi)]
,
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where all expectations are computed under the common prior Fθ.
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Timing.
• At stage 1, platforms simultaneously set prices on each side.
• At stage 2, after observing the platforms’ prices, and after observing their own stand-alone
valuations, all agents simultaneously choose which platform to join.
• At stage 3, payoffs are realized.
As anticipated above, we focus on equilibria in which agents single-home and where no agent opts
out of the market. In the baseline model, we thus assume that all agents must join one of the two
platforms and cannot join both. In the Supplementary Material, however, we identify conditions
under which the equilibrium allocations in the baseline model are also equilibrium allocations in a
more general game in which all agents can opt out of the market and/or multi-home.
Finally, hereafter, we say that a strategy profile for the agents constitutes a continuation (Bayes-
Nash) equilibrium in the game that starts after the platforms announce their prices if the action
taken by each agent’s type constitutes a best response to all other agents’ strategies.
3 Benchmarks
We start by considering two benchmarks. The first one is a market without network effects. The
second is a market with complete information. These benchmarks serve the purpose of illustrating
that the novel effects we document below originate precisely in the combination of network effects
with dispersed information.
Benchmark 1 (absence of network effects). Suppose that γ1 = γ2 = 0. In this case, the
demand that each platform expects on each side is independent of the price it sets on the opposite
side of the market.
Given the prices pAi and p
B
i set by the two platforms on side i= 1, 2, each agent l from side i
whose differential in stand-alone valuations vil exceeds the threshold vˆi = p
B
i − pAi joins platform B,
whereas each agent with differential vil < vˆi joins platform A. The (direct residual) demand curve
that each platform k expects on each side i is thus given by Qki (vˆi). We then have the following
result:
15Note that, as standard in the definition of Bayesian games, irrespective of whether or not beliefs are consistent
with a common prior, the mappings Mji(·|vi) from types to beliefs are common knowledge. A common prior simply
imposes restrictions on these mappings, as well as on the platforms’ beliefs. Finally note that the functions Qki and
Mji do not provide a complete description of the platforms’ and of the agents’ beliefs. However, as we show below,
they summarize all the information that is relevant for the equilibrium prices and the agents’ participation decisions.
9
Proposition 1. Suppose there are no network effects (i.e., γi = 0, i = 1, 2). The equilibrium prices,
along with the participation thresholds they induce, must satisfy the following conditions
pki =
Qki (vˆi)
|dQki (vˆi)/dvi|
, (1)
along with vˆi = p
B
i − pAi , i = 1, 2, k = A,B.
The conditions for the optimal prices are the familiar conditions for a duopoly equilibrium with
horizontally differentiated products. Clearly, in this benchmark, the dispersion of information is
irrelevant. The prices set by the two platforms reflect only the platforms’ own beliefs.
Benchmark 2 (complete information). Next, suppose network effects are positive, but as-
sume information is complete, meaning that the cross-sectional distribution of stand-alone valuations
is commonly known by the platforms and by all agents. The platforms’ beliefs then coincide with
the beliefs of any other agent. Formally,
Mji (vj |vi) = QAj (vj) = 1−QBj (vj), all (vi, vj) ∈ R2, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
In the Appendix (see Lemma 1), we show that, as long as the network effects are not too large, for
any vector of prices p ≡ (pA1 , pA2 , pB1 , pB2 ) set by the two platforms, there exists a unique continuation
equilibrium and it is in threshold strategies.16 All side-i agents whose differential in stand-alone
valuations exceeds vˆi join platform B, whereas all agents whose differential is below vˆi join platform
A, where the thresholds vˆ1 and vˆ2 are given by the unique solution to
vˆi = p
B
i − pAi + γi
[
QAj (vˆj)−QBj (vˆj)
]
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. (2)
Now fix the prices set by platform A. For any vector of participation rates (Q1, Q2), the prices
that platform B must set to implement the participation rates Q1 and Q2 are given by
pBi = p
A
i + vˆi + 2γiQj − γi, with vˆi s.t. QBi (vˆi) = Qi , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. (3)
Platform B’s profits (expressed as a function of the participation rates (Q1, Q2)) are thus equal to
ΠB =
∑
i,j=1,2,j 6=i
[
pAi + vˆi + 2γiQj − γi
]
Qi. (4)
We then have the following result:
Proposition 2. Suppose information is complete. The equilibrium prices, along with the participa-
tion thresholds they induce, must satisfy the following conditions
pki =
Qki (vˆi)
|dQki (vˆi)/dvi|
− 2γjQkj (vˆj), (5)
along with vˆi = p
B
i − pAi + γi
[
QAj (vˆj)−QBj (vˆj)
]
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
16For large network effects, the continuation equilibrium is not unique. See, among others, Caillaud and Jullien
(2001, 2003). For small network effects, instead, the unique continuation equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable
strategy profile. It thus does not require that agents be able to coordinate with other agents. This is appealing,
especially in large markets, which are the focus of the paper.
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The profit-maximizing prices thus solve the familiar optimality conditions (5) according to which
each platform’s price on each side equals the platform one-sided inverse semi-elasticity, Qki (vˆi)/|dQki (vˆi)/dvi|,
adjusted by the effect of a variation in side-i’s participation on side-j’s willingness to pay (the term
2γjQ
k
j in (5)—see, for example, Weyl (2010)).he
4 Pricing under Dispersed Information
We now turn to the case where network effects interact with dispersed information.
4.1 Preliminaries: Monopoly Analysis
As a first step toward the characterization of the duopoly equilibrium, but also as a convenient tool
to introduce some of the key ideas in the simplest possible way, suppose, for a moment, that there
is a single platform in the market and, without loss of generality, let such a platform be platform B.
Then drop all superscripts pertaining to the platform’s identity to ease the notation. Importantly,
the platform does not necessarily cover the entire market. In the context of the illustrative example
introduced above, this means that, given the price for the platform’s new smartphone (or new
console), certain end-users may decide to stay with the old phone, or old video-game console.17
Likewise, given the price asked by the platform to the developers to place an app in its library,
certain developers may prefer to not develop for the platform.
Recall that the payoff that each agent l ∈ [0, 1] from each side i = 1, 2 obtains from the outside
option is equal to zero and that his stand-alone valuation for platform B’s product is equal to
si + vil/2. Each agent l ∈ [0, 1] from each side i = 1, 2 then joins the platform if
si +
vil
2
+ γiE[qj | vil] ≥ pi, (6)
and opts out if the inequality is reversed, where E[qj | vil] is the side-j participation expected by the
agent. Provided the network effects are not too large, we then have that, for any vector of prices
(p1, p2), the demand expected by the platform on each side i = 1, 2 is given by Qi(vˆi), where (vˆ1, vˆ2)
is the unique solution to the system of equations given by18
si +
vˆi
2
+ γi[1−Mji (vˆj | vˆi)] = pi, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. (7)
Now, again in the context of our illustrative example, suppose the platform aims at getting on
board Q1 end-users from side one and Q2 developers from side 2. Which prices should it set?
17Keeping the old console may be viewed as a case where those agents who do not join platform B join another
platform with a large base of pre-committed agents on all sides, for which the participation of additional users does
not bring significant additional network effects.
18The precise bound on the network effects that guarantees uniqueness of the demand system, for any price vector, is
the same as the one identified by Conditions (M) and (Q) below in the duopoly case — see the Supplementary Material
(Lemma S1) for details.
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Obviously, because the platform does not know the exact state of the world (i.e., the exact distribution
of preferences among the end-users and of the exact distribution of opportunity costs among the
developers), the quantities Q1 and Q2 must be interpreted as the expected participation rates, where
the expectation is taken over all possible states of the world using the platform’s own beliefs. Given
the platform’s beliefs, the prices (p1, p2) should thus be set so as to induce participation thresholds
vˆ1 and vˆ2 satisfying Qi(vˆi) = Qi, i = 1, 2. Using (7), we then have that the prices should be set equal
to
pi = si +
vˆi
2
+ γi[1−Mji (vˆj | vˆi)]. (8)
Differences in beliefs between the platform and the agents then manifest themselves in the dif-
ference between Qj and 1 −Mji (vˆj |vˆi), where the former is the side-j participation expected by
the platform and the latter is the side-j participation expected by the side-i marginal agent (the one
who is just indifferent between joining and not joining the platform). The novel effects then origi-
nate from the fact that, holding Qj constant, any change in the side-i participation expected by the
platform comes with a variation in the side-i’s marginal agent’s beliefs about the side-j participation
according to
∂E[qj |vˆi]
∂vˆi
=
∂ [1−Mji (vˆj |vˆi)]
∂vˆi
. (9)
When network effects are positive, as assumed here, and preferences are aligned between the two
sides, this novel effect contributes to steeper inverse demand curves, whereas the opposite is true
when preferences are misaligned. This is intuitive. When preferences are aligned, the new marginal
agent that the platform brings on board when it lowers its price on side i is less optimistic about
the side-j’s participation than those agents who are already on board (the infra-marginal agents).
This means that, to get the new marginal agent on board, the reduction in the side-i price must be
larger than the one necessary to induce the same increase in the side-i participation under complete
information. Interestingly, this novel effect is present even if the platform adjusts its price on side
j so as to maintain the side-j participation threshold vˆj fixed (which amounts to maintaining the
side-j’s demand Qj expected by the platform constant).
The above novel effects play an important role for equilibrium prices, as we show next. Given the
bijective relationship between the prices (p1, p2) and the participation thresholds (vˆ1, vˆ2) given by
(8), we have that the prices (p1, p2) maximize the platform’s profits if and only if the participation
thresholds (vˆ1, vˆ2) they induce solve the following problem:
max
(v1,v2)
Πˆ (v1, v2) ≡
∑
i,j=1,2,j 6=i
{
si +
vi
2
+ γi[1−Mji (vj | vi)]
}
Qi(vi). (10)
We then have the following result:
Proposition 3. Suppose a single platform is active in the market and information is dispersed.
The profit-maximizing prices, along with the participation thresholds they induce, must satisfy the
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following optimality conditions
pi =
Qi(vˆi)
2|dQi(vˆi)/dvi| − γj
∂Mij (vˆi | vˆj)
∂vi
Qj(vˆj)
|dQi(vˆi)/dvi| − γi
∂Mji (vˆj | vˆi)
∂vi
Qi(vˆi)
|dQi(vˆi)/dvi| , (11)
along with si +
vˆi
2 + γi[1−Mji (vˆj | vˆi)] = pi, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Note that the price formulas in (11) are the incomplete-information analogs of the familiar
complete-information optimality conditions19
Pi = −∂Pi(Q1, Q2)
∂Qi
Qi − ∂Pj(Q1, Q2)
∂Qi
Qj . (12)
They require that profits do not change when the platform increases the expected side-i participation
and then adjusts the side-j price to maintain the expected side-j participation constant.
In particular, the first term in (11) is the familiar inverse semi-elasticity of the demand curve in
the absence of network effects.
The second term in (11) captures the extra benefit of cutting the price on side i that comes from
the possibility of raising the price on side j as a result of attracting more agents from side i (see,
e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2006 and Armstrong, 2006). The novelty, relative to complete information,
is that the variation in the side-i participation that the platform expects to trigger by varying its
side-i price now differs from the variation expected by the side-j marginal agent. This novel effect is
captured by the term
∂E[qi | vˆj ]
∂Qi
∣∣∣∣
vˆj=const
=
∂Mij (vˆi | vˆj)
∂vi
1
|dQ(vˆi)/dvi|
in (11), which measures the sensitivity of the beliefs of the side-j’s marginal agent to changes in
the demand expected by the platform on side i.20 Note that, irrespective of whether preferences
are aligned or misaligned between the two sides, this term is always positive, thus contributing to a
lower price on side i.
The third term in (11) is the most interesting one, for this term is absent under complete infor-
mation. As explained above, this term originates in the fact that a variation in the side-i demand
expected by the platform implies a variation in the side-i marginal agent’s beliefs about the side j’s
participation. When preferences are aligned, by steepening the slope of the inverse demand, this
term contributes to reducing the platform’s incentives to lower its side-i price. The opposite is true
when preferences are misaligned.
4.2 Duopoly Analysis
We now return to the duopoly game where both platforms are active in the market. As usual, we
solve the game backwards by considering first the continuation game that starts after the platforms
19To see this, note that ∂Pi
∂Qi
= ∂Pi/∂vi
∂Qi/∂vi
=
1−γi∂Mji(vˆj |vˆi)/∂vi
dQi/dvi
and
∂Pj
∂Qi
=
∂Pj/∂vi
∂Qi/∂vi
=
γj∂Mij(vˆi|vˆj)/∂vi
dQi/dvi
.
20Note that, under complete information, instead, ∂Mij (vˆi | vˆj) /∂vi = |dQi(vˆi)/dvi|, in which case the second term
in (11) reduces to −γjQj(vˆj).
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set their prices p = (pA1 , p
A
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2 ). Each agent l ∈ [0, 1] from each side i = 1, 2 then chooses
platform B when
vil + γiE[qBj − qAj | vil] > pBi − pAi , (13)
and platform A when the above inequality is reversed. Arguments similar to those in the monopolist
case then imply that, when network effects are not too large (formally when Conditions (M) and (Q)
below hold), for any p, there is a unique continuation equilibrium and it is in threshold strategies.
Each agent l ∈ [0, 1] from each side i = 1, 2 joins platform B if vil > vˆi and platform A if vil < vˆi,
with the thresholds (vˆ1, vˆ2) solving the following indifference conditions
vˆi + γi − 2γiMji (vˆj | vˆi) = pBi − pAi i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. (14)
Notice that 1 − 2Mji (vˆj | vˆi) = E[qBj − qAj | vˆi] is the differential in the side-j participation to the
two platforms, as expected by the side-i marginal agent with value vˆi. As we show in the Appendix
(Lemma 2), the following conditions guarantee existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system
of equations in (14):
Condition (M): For any i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, any v1, v2 ∈ R,
1− 2γi∂Mji (vj |vi)
∂vi
> 0.
Condition (Q). For any i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, any v1, v2 ∈ R,
γ1γ2 <
[
1
2 − γ1 ∂M21(v2|v1)∂v1
] [
1
2 − γ2 ∂M12(v1|v2)∂v2
]
∂M12(v1|v2)
∂v1
∂M21(v2|v1)
∂v2
.
Condition (M) is always satisfied when preferences are aligned between the two sides. When
preferences are misaligned, the condition imposes that network effects be small. This condition
guarantees that a best response to agents from the opposite side following a threshold strategy is a
threshold strategy.21
Condition (Q), in turn, guarantees convergence of monotone best responses to a unique fixed
point by bounding the slope of best responses. Jointly, the above two conditions guarantee existence
and uniqueness of a monotone continuation equilibrium. Standard arguments then imply that such
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the continuation game.
Hereafter, we maintain that Conditions (M) and (Q) hold. Under these conditions, for any vector
of prices p, the residual demand expected by each platform on each side i = 1, 2 is then given by
Qki (vˆi), where (vˆ1, vˆ2) is the unique solution to the equations in (14). Arguments similar to the ones
discussed above for the monopolist case then lead to the following result:
21This is intuitive. If preferences are misaligned and network effects are strong, then an increase in the appreciation
of platform B’s product by agent l from side i could make the agent less willing to join the platform as a result of the
fact that the agent may expect fewer agents from the opposite side to be appreciative of the platform’s product and
hence to join.
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Proposition 4. Suppose both platforms are active in the market and compete under dispersed in-
formation. The equilibrium prices, along with the participation thresholds they induce, must satisfy
the following optimality conditions
pki =
Qki (vˆi)
|dQki (vˆi)/dvi|
− 2γj ∂Mij (vˆi | vˆj)
∂vi
Qkj (vˆj)
|dQki (vˆi)/dvi|
− 2γi∂Mji (vˆj | vˆi)
∂vi
Qki (vˆi)
|dQki (vˆi)/dvi|
(15)
along with pBi − pAi = vˆi + γi − 2γiMji (vˆj | vˆi), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, k = A,B.
The interpretation of the different terms in (15) is the same as in the monopoly case. The reason
why all the terms involving the network effects are scaled by a factor of two is that, under single-
homing and full market coverage, the benefit of attracting more agents on board on each side i
combines the direct benefit of providing the side-j agents with a larger user base with the indirect
effect of reducing the attractiveness of the other platform.
The formulas in Proposition 4 are fairly general, in the sense that they apply to markets in which
one platform is perceived as superior to the other, as well as to markets in which the information
the two platforms possess need not be the same, nor need it originate from a common prior. These
formulas, however, simplify significantly, permitting a close-form representation, in markets in which
the two platforms perceive competition to be symmetric, in the following sense:
Definition 2. Competition is symmetric if (a) platforms set equal prices on each side (i.e., pAi = p
B
i ,
i = 1, 2) and expect to share the market evenly (i.e., QAi = Q
B
i = 1/2, i = 1, 2), and (b) when
platforms set equal prices, all agents select the platform for which their stand-alone valuation is the
highest.
Because the platforms’ beliefs need not originate from a common prior, the definition does not
impose any restriction on the unobserved distribution of stand-alone valuations. The following is
then a direct implication of the previous proposition22:
Corollary 1. Suppose competition is symmetric and information is dispersed. Beliefs must satisfy
the following properties: (a) Qki (0) = 1/2, k = A,B, (b) there exists ψi(0) > 0, i = 1, 2, such that
|dQki (0)/dvi| = ψi(0), k = A,B, and (c) Mij(0|0) = 1/2, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. The equilibrium prices are
given by
pki =
1
2ψi(0)
− γj
 ∂Mij(0|0)∂vi
ψi(0)
− γi
 ∂Mji(0|0)∂vi
ψi(0)
 , k = A,B, i = 1, 2. (16)
As in the complete-information case, equilibrium prices increase with the inverse-semi-elasticity of
the component of the demand that comes from the stand-alone valuations (the first term in the price
equation), and decrease with the intensity of the network effect from the opposite side. However,
22It should be obvious that the conclusions in the corollary below cease to hold if beliefs about the distribution of
stand-alone valuations depend on the intensity of the network effects. When this is the case, there need not be any
specific relation between the intensity of the network effects and the equilibrium prices.
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contrary to complete information, equilibrium prices under dispersed information increase with the
intensity of the own-side network effects when preferences are aligned between the two sides, and
decrease when they are misaligned.23
Hence, when competition is symmetric, each platform expects the measure of agents preferring
platform A’s product to platform B’s product to be the same as the measure of agents preferring
B’s to A’s (property (a) in the corollary). Furthermore, the two platforms must hold identical
beliefs concerning the density of agents who are indifferent between the two platforms’ products
(property (b)). Finally, each agent who is just indifferent between the two platforms’ products must
believe that the measure of agents from the opposite side preferring platform A’s product to platform
B’s product is the same as the measure of agents preferring platform B’s product to platform A’s
(property (c)).24
The above results pertain to a market in which agents single-home (that is, they join only one
platform) and cannot opt out of the market. In the Supplementary Material, we show that, under
reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium properties identified above extend to environments in which
agents can multi-home and/or opt out of the market, provided that platforms cannot set negative
prices.25
5 Information Management
The analysis in the previous section uncovers how equilibrium prices depend on the uncertainty that
market participants face about the platforms’ ability to attract participation on each side of the
market. Equipped with the above results, we now investigate the platforms’ incentives to invest in
platform design and in various information management policies aimed at promoting their ability to
attract agents from the different sides of the market. Most of such policies also affect the agents’ own
appreciation for the platforms’ products, i.e., the level and slope of the component of the demands
that comes from the stand-alone valuations. The latter effects, however, are not specific to platform
markets and have received considerable attention in the literature (see, among others, Anderson and
Renault (2006, 2009), and Johnson and Myatt (2006)). Hereafter, we focus on the aspects of such
23Observe that, under complete information, when competition is symmetric, the duopoly prices are given by
pki =
1
2λθi (0)
− γj , k = A,B, i = 1, 2,
where λθi (0) is the density of the true distribution of the side-i differentials in stand-alone valuations.
24Under a common prior, these conditions are satisfied, for example, when each state is parametrized by a vector
θ = (θ1, θ2) such that, given θi, vil = θi + εil with εil drawn independently across agents from a distribution Gi that
is symmetric around zero (i.e., such that Gi(a) = 1 − Gi(−a) all a ∈ R), with θ = (θ1, θ2) drawn from a distribution
Fθ with marginals that are also symmetric around zero, as in the Gaussian model in the next section.
25See Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Armstrong and Wright (2006), Bergemann and Bonatti (2011), Athey, Calvano
and Gans (2012), and Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger (2013) for models that allow for multihoming under complete
information, and Amelio and Jullien (2010) for the effects of negative prices.
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policies that are specific to platform markets. As discussed in Reillier and Reillier (2017), platforms
need to innovate on their typical branding strategies to promote their ability to attract users from
other sides of the market. We examine the key trade-offs that platforms face in shaping the agents’
beliefs about the participation of other sides and show how the latter affect the structure of the
demands and the intensity of competition among platforms.
Consistently with what we anticipated in the Introduction, we distinguish between pre-launch
policies, i.e., initiatives such as marketing campaigns, the promotion of online communities, and
the sponsorship of forums, blogs, and specialized conferences that platforms use at the early stages
to promote their ability to attract participation from other sides of the market, and post-launch
disclosures whereby platforms influence the decisions of late adopters through the dissemination of
information about earlier participation decisions.
5.1 Gaussian model
To investigate the effects of such policies on equilibrium profits, consumer surplus, and welfare in a
tractable way, we consider a market with Gaussian information. We also enrich the framework by
allowing agents to possess information that is only imperfectly correlated with their own stand-alone
valuations. This enrichment permits us to isolate the novel effects of information on the agents’
ability to predict the participation of the other side of the market from the more familiar effects of
information on the distribution of the agents’ perceived valuations.
Accordingly, we distinguish between an agent’s true differential in stand-alone valuations, Vil,
and an agent’s estimated differential in stand-alone valuations, vil. We assume the “aggregate state
of the world” is parametrized by a bi-dimensional vector θ ∈ R2 drawn from a bi-variate Normal
distribution with zero mean and given variance-covariance matrix. Each agent does not observe
his true preference Vil but receives a signal xil that is correlated with Vil. The state of the world
determines the joint distribution of true preferences and signals in the population. Precisely, we
assume that, conditionally on θ, each pair (Vil, xil) is drawn independently across agents from a
bi-variate Normal distribution with fixed variance-covariance matrix and a mean given by a linear
function of θ. We let vil ≡ E [Vil | xil] stand for an agent’s estimated stand-alone differential and,
without loss of generality, we then normalize the signal xil so that vil = xil.
The above structure is common knowledge among the platforms and the agents. This implies that
ex-ante (and hence, from the platforms’ perspective), the joint distribution of estimated stand-alone
differentials in the population is Gaussian with mean (0, 0) and variance-covariance matrix
Σv =
 (βv1)−1 ρv√βv1βv2
ρv√
βv1β
v
2
(βv2)
−1
 ,
where ρv∈ [0, 1] is the coefficient of linear correlation between any pair of estimated stand-alone
differentials of any two agents from opposite sides and where βvi is the precision of the marginal of
17
the above distribution with respect to the ith-dimension, i= 1, 2.26 The marginals of this distribution
with respect to each dimension vi thus correspond to the functions Q
k
i in the general model. In
particular, letting Φ denote the c.d.f. of the Standard Normal distribution (with density φ), we have
that
QAi (vi) = Φ
(√
βvi vi
)
= 1−QBi (vi).
Finally note that each agent from each side i= 1, 2 with differential vi believes the distribution
of stand-alone differentials on the opposite side to be Gaussian with mean E[vj |vi] = ρv
√
βvi
βvj
vi and
variance
(
1− ρ2v
)
/βvj .
27 It follows that
Mji (vj | vi) = Φ
(√
1 + Ω2
√
βvj vj − Ω
√
βvi vi
)
(17)
where
Ω ≡ ρv√
1− ρ2v
. (18)
Note that |Ω|measures the sensitivity of each agent’s posterior beliefs about the distribution of stand-
alone differentials on the other side of the market to his own stand-alone differential. Equivalently,
|Ω| measures the ability of each side to use individual appreciations for the platforms’ products to
forecast participation decisions on the opposite side of the market. The sign of Ω, instead, captures
the alignment in preferences across the two sides. Hereafter, we refer to the term Ω as to the coefficient
of mutual forecastability and to |Ω| as the ability of each side to predict participation decisions on
the opposite side of the market.28
The following proposition translates the result about pricing derived in Proposition 4 to the
Gaussian environment under consideration.
Proposition 5. Suppose information is Gaussian, as described above. The duopoly equilibrium
prices are then given by
p∗i =
1
2
√
βvi φ(0)
− γj
√
1 + Ω2 + γiΩ, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, (19)
where (2
√
βvi φ(0))
−1 is the inverse semi-elasticity of the component of the demand curves that comes
from the stand-alone valuations, and where Ω is the coefficient of mutual forecastability.
In the Gaussian case, the equilibrium price on each side thus depends on the details of the payoff
and information structure only through (a) the coefficient of ex-ante dispersion of the stand-alone
26See the Supplementary Material for a flexible family of Gaussian economies satisfying all the assumptions above.
27To compute these formulas, use standard properties of the Gaussian distribution to obtain that
E [vjl′ | vil] = cov[vjl
′ , vil]
var[vil]
vil = ρv
√
βvi
βvj
vil and var [vjl′ | vil] = var[vjl′ ](1− ρ2v) = 1− ρ
2
v
βvj
.
28Note that 1 + Ω2 =
var[vj ]
var[vj−E[vj |vi]] . Hence, for given var[vj ], a larger |Ω| implies a smaller variance of the forecast
error.
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valuations (the term 1/
√
βvi =
√
var[vi] in the price equations) and (b) the coefficient of mutual
forecastability, Ω. The sign of Ω, which is the same as the sign of ρv = corr(vi, vj), reflects whether
preferences are aligned or misaligned between the two sides. The sign of Ω is thus what determines
whether the equilibrium price p∗i on each side increases or decreases with the intensity γi of that
side’s own network effects (recall the discussion in the general model). In contrast, when it comes
to the impact on equilibrium prices of the intensity of the network effects on the opposite side, γj ,
what matters is only |Ω|. This is because the ability of the side-j agents to forecast variations in the
side-i participation depends only on the intensity of the correlation in preferences across sides and
not on its sign.
Note that a higher Ω contributes to a higher sum of the equilibrium prices. It also contributes
to higher price skewness (i.e., to a higher |p∗1 − p∗2|) if, and only if, the side with the highest price is
the one on which the network effects are the largest (that is, if, and only if, (p∗1 − p∗2)(γ1 − γ2) > 0).
5.2 Pre-launch information management
“Platforms should .... champion a set of clear and powerful values and a design identity that resonate
with both user and producer communities.” (Reillier and Reillier, 2017).
The development and launch of a new platform involves two stages. In the first stage, the
developer must define the service and design the platform. In the second stage, the developer must
convince enough potential users on each side to join. This second stage is often referred to as
ignition (see, e.g., Evans and Schmalensee, 2015, and Reillier and Reillier, 2017, for a description of
the various stages in the development of a platform). These stages involve significant uncertainty
about the platform’s eventual success in attracting participation on each side, as exemplified by the
failure of Microsoft or RIM to promote new mobile operating systems. As a result, platforms invest
significant resources in design and communication strategies aimed at aligning preferences across
sides and persuading agents on each side about the appeal of the platform on the opposite side.29
In this section, we discuss a platform’s incentives to affect the agents’ information and the impli-
cations for welfare and consumer surplus.
From the price equations (19), we have that, in equilibrium, profits are given by
Π∗ =
1
2
(p∗1 + p
∗
2) =
1
2
{
1
2
√
βv1φ(0)
+
1
2
√
βv2φ(0)
+ (γ1 + γ2)
(
Ω−
√
1 + Ω2
)}
. (20)
As for total welfare, we show in the Appendix (see the proof of Proposition 6 below) that the latter
is given by
W = K+
∑
i=1,2
E [VilI(vil > 0)] + (γ1 + γ2)Pr (v1v2 ≥ 0) , (21)
29See also Lee and O’Connor (2003) for a discussion of the motives for pre-launch announcements in markets with net-
work effects. One motive is consumers’ ”expectation management”, another motive is the encouragement of investment
in complementary products (which can be interpreted as participation on one side). A third motive is preemption.
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where K is a constant. The term E [VilI(vil > 0)] in W measures the side-i’s ability to identify the
platform for which the stand-alone valuation is the highest. The term Pr (v1v2 ≥ 0) in turn captures
the agents’ ability to coordinate across sides by ending up on the same platform.
Finally, consumer surplus is given by CS = W − 2Π∗.
The policies that most platforms use to influence the agents’ participation decisions affect both
the agents’ ability to estimate their own stand-alone valuations as well as their ability to predict the
participation decisions on the other side of the market. Enhancing the agents’ ability to estimate their
own valuations soften competition by increasing the heterogeneity in the agents’ perceived valuations.
This effect is captured by an increase in the variance 1/βvi of the estimated stand-alone differentials,
which unambiguously contributes to higher profits. Such effect is thus similar to the effect of an
increase in the degree of differentiation between firms and is not specific to platform markets (see,
for example, Johnson and Myatt (2006), and Anderson and Renault (2009)). Interestingly, when
agents are imperfectly informed, such policies also improve welfare by helping the agents identify
the platform for which their stand-alone valuation is the highest. This effect is captured by the first
term in (21).
In the analysis below, we focus on the effects of the aforementioned policies that are specific to
platform markets by analyzing how such policies affect the contribution of network effects to profits,
welfare, and consumer surplus, as captured by the last terms in (20) and (21).
Proposition 6. Holding βvi constant, i = 1, 2, platforms’ policies that increase the alignment in
preferences across sides (formally captured by an increase in ρv) increase both profits and total welfare,
but decrease consumer surplus.
When preferences are aligned, an increase in ρv implies a higher sensitivity of the marginal
agents’ expectation of the other side’s participation to their own valuation (see Condition (17)). As
explained in the previous section, this effect contributes to a lower elasticity of the demands and
hence to higher equilibrium prices. At the same time, a higher ρv also implies a higher sensitivity
of the marginal agents’ expectation of the other side’s participation to variations in prices on the
opposite side, which contributes negatively to the cross-price elasticities of the demands (see again
Condition (17)). While the net effect of a higher ρv on the equilibrium prices on each side depends on
the relative importance that each side attaches to interacting with the opposite side, the net effect of
a higher ρv on the sum of the equilibrium prices and hence on total profits is unambiguously positive.
When, instead, preferences are mis-aligned, an increase in ρv implies a lower sensitivity of the
marginal agents’ expectation of the other side’s participation to their own valuations. This is because
the marginal agents are more optimistic about the other side’s participation than the infra-marginal
agents. Thus, the larger |ρv|, the smaller the reduction in prices necessary to get new agents on
board, and hence the larger the elasticity of the residual demands. An increase in alignment, by
reducing |ρv|, thus contributes to a reduction in both the elasticity of the demands to their own
prices and in the cross-price elasticities. As both elasticities contribute to lower prices, a higher
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alignment contributes to higher prices on both sides and hence to higher profits.
Next, consider the effect of alignment on total welfare. A higher alignment contributes to a higher
probability that any two agents from opposite sides end up on the same platform (formally captured
by the second term in (21)). When the sum of the network effect is positive, as assumed here, a
higher alignment thus contributes unambiguously to higher welfare.
Lastly, consider the effect of alignment on consumer surplus. On the one hand, agents benefit
from the enhanced ability to coordinate with agents from the opposite side. On the other hand,
prices are necessarily higher at least on one side. Whether agents suffer or benefit from a higher
alignment in preferences then depends on which side they belong to and on which of the above two
effects prevail. Interestingly, in the Gaussian model, total consumer surplus always decreases with
ρv.
The above conclusions extend to markets in which network effects are positive on one side but
negative on the other, provided that γ1 + γ2 > 0. When, instead, γ1 + γ2 < 0, the above conclusions
are reversed: more alignment in stand-alone valuations across the two sides contributes to lower
profits and lower total welfare, but higher consumer surplus.
What is interesting about the result in Proposition 6 is that it identifies fairly general channels
through which information policies aimed at aligning preferences across sides affect profits, welfare,
and consumer surplus, without specifying the granular mechanics by which such policies operate.
It should also be clear that, while we focus on the effects of such policies on the agents’ ability to
predict participation decisions on the opposite side of the market, in many cases of interest, such
policies also affect the agents’ ability to predict their own valuations.
There are many ways platforms may affect the alignment in preferences across sides. For our
purpose, hereafter we distinguish between policies directly aimed at changing the agents’ information
from policies that affect directly the distribution of preferences such as platform design.
5.2.1 Platform design
“With platforms, a critical strategic aim is strong up-front design that will attract the desired partic-
ipants, enable the right interactions (so-called core interactions), and encourage ever-more-powerful
network effects.” ( Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary, Harvard Business Review (2016)).
We start by considering policies that affect the distribution from which the true stand-alone
valuations are drawn. As anticipated above, such policies should be interpreted as the result of
platform design. The latter has many facets. Here we focus on design decisions that affect the
alignment of preferences across the two sides.
An example of such policies is the design of a collaborative architecture (see, e.g., Pisani and
Verganti (2008)), that is, the process by which a users’ community is allowed to contribute to the
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design of the platform through interactive communication. In the context of our illustrative example
of mobile software platforms, alignment by design includes the choice by a software platform to
favor aspects of its code that are considered both user- and developer-friendly, or the choice by a
smartphone, or a video-game console, provider to favor dimensions such as image resolution, or low
latency, that improve consumer experience but also permit developers to provide more sophisticated
and flexible applications. For instance Samsung succeeded to overcome Apple’s leadership by betting
on larger screens, a feature that favors apps’ experience and thus appeals to both end-users and
developers, but which could have failed had users favored lighter handsets.
Clearly, more alignment in the true preferences need not imply more alignment in the estimated
valuations, which is what platforms care about. For instance, if the side-1 agents possess no informa-
tion about the side-2 agents’ preferences (which is the case when the variation in the side-1 agents’
preferences originates entirely in idiosyncratic preference shocks), then ρv = 0. In this case, increas-
ing the alignment in the true preferences has no effect on the correlation between the estimated
differentials, and hence no effect on profit and welfare. However, in general, when each side possesses
some information about the distribution of preferences on the opposite side, more alignment in the
true preferences results in more alignment in the perceived preferences, and hence in higher profits
and total welfare.
It is useful to compare the above results to their counterparts in standard one-sided markets.
Johnson and Myatt (2006) show that, in a standard one-sided market without network effects, a
monopolist maximizes profits by choosing a product design that either maximizes or minimizes the
dispersion of valuations in the market. In a duopoly without network effects, equilibrium profits
are always maximal under maximal dispersion, for dispersion softens competition. Our analysis
reveals two departures from the optimality of maximal dispersion. First, the need to court both
sides calls for a design that favors dimensions that maximize the sum of the dispersion of stand-
alone valuations. Such design is typically different from the one that maximizes dispersion on each
side. Second, platforms benefit from aligning preferences across the two sides. Once again, this is
typically achieved by investing in multiple dimensions as opposed to focusing on the single dimension
for which the dispersion of stand-alone differentials is maximal on each side.
The above results also bring a new perspective on the role of algorithmic price formation protocols
in trading platforms, such as those used by Uber. From a welfare perspective, allowing platforms to
interfere in the price formation mechanism has the benefits of permitting the various sides to adjust
to variations in supply and demand conditions. From the platform’s perspective, welfare-enhancing
protocols bring higher profits by permitting the platform to charge higher fees. The price formation
mechanism has also the additional benefit of correlating participation decisions across sides. Indeed,
consider a trading platform where the two sides are buyers and sellers. Suppose that exogenous
shocks to supply and demand are uncorrelated. If the platform imposes a fixed trading price, there
is no correlation between the two sides’ participation decisions. If, instead, the platform’s transaction
prices adjust to supply and demand conditions, then participation levels are correlated across the
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two sides, which brings the benefits discussed above.30
5.2.2 Disclosures
Think of a smart-phone company or a video-game console producer entering the market with a new
operating system or a new console. The firm must decide how much information to disclose to
the public about the various features of its product. These disclosures affect both the developers’
and the end-users’ ability to estimate their own stand-alone valuations (both in absolute value and
relative to the products offered by rival firms). They also serve the purpose of persuading users and
developers of the platform’s ability to attract agents from the other side. As pointed by Lee and
O’Connor (2003), ”when network effects exist, the strategic reason for pre-announcing is to gain a
faster takeoff by managing consumers’ expectations”. For example, prior to releasing Wii, Nintendo
engaged in various marketing campaigns aimed at promoting the new console to both potential
gamers and developers (see Sterlicchi (2013)). Representatives were hired to provide interactive
demos at home-shows, fitness expos, and major malls. As reported in Chellappa and Mukherjee
(2017), such pre-launch initiatives are believed to have played a major role in Wii’s success. On
the other hand, the specialized press has often criticized Microsoft for not providing the market
with enough details regarding its Xbox One, thus failing to persuade gamers and developers of the
network’s potentiality of its console (see, Gallaway (2013), and Chellappa and Mukherjee, (2017)).
Another example of such pre-launch campaigns is RIM’s decision the year preceding the launch of
its Blackberry 10 to give away thousand of prototypes phones to developers.31 A key motivation was
to overcome its reputation of being unable to deliver promised quality to consumers. RIM followed
a similar strategy for its PlayBook tablet.
We think of pre-launch disclosures as part of a broader class of information management policies
aimed at influencing the agents’ participation decisions (referred to as psychological positioning by
Arthur (1996)). Such policies also include the sponsorship of forums, blogs, and conferences that
platforms use to cultivate and manage expectations. For example, Google uses its portal Google
Android Authority to promote communication between end-users and app developers. Likewise,
Apple uses its annual Apple World Wide Developer Conference to help iOS developers predict end-
users’ interests (see, e.g., Fo¨rderer (2017)).
Following the terminology of Johnson and Myatt (2006), we distinguish between “hypes” and
“real information.” The former refer to persuasive campaigns that change the level of demand
expected by the platforms. The latter, instead, refer to campaigns that do not change the level of
demand, on average, but affect the dispersion of perceived valuations and of beliefs about the other
side’s participation. We focus on these latter campaigns. Such campaigns may operate along various
dimensions and may involve advertising, blogs, forums, and the release of prototypes and freeware.
30See also Castillo, Knoepfle, and Weyl (2018) for an analysis of the benefits of algorithmic pricing in the context of
share riding.
31See Austen (2012), ”BlackBerry 10 Prototype Is Given To Developers”, The New York Times.
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Consistently with the analysis above, we abstain from the granular mechanics of such campaigns
and isolate the novel effects specific to platform markets by focusing on how variations in the agents’
ability to predict the participation of the other side affects profits, welfare and consumer surplus.
Proposition 7. Suppose preferences are aligned across sides. Holding βvi fixed, i = 1, 2, information
policies that increase the agents’ ability to predict participation decisions on the opposite side of the
market (formally captured by an increase in |Ω|) increase profits and total welfare but reduce consumer
surplus. When, instead, preferences are misaligned, such policies decrease profits and total welfare
but increase consumer surplus.
Consider campaigns on side i that, by providing information about features of the platform
relevant for the other side, reduce the side-i agents’ idiosyncratic interpretation of what is likely
to be appreciated by the agents on side j. As mentioned above, an example of such campaigns is
Apple’s use of its annual World Wide Developers’ conference as a means to provide developers with
information about new market niches for its mobile operating system (see, e.g., Fo¨rderer (2017)).
When preferences are aligned, that is, when ρv > 0, such campaigns, by increasing the correlation
in the estimated stand-alone valuations across the two sides, contribute to higher profits and total
welfare. The opposite is true when preferences are mis-aligned. In this case, an increase in the
agents’ ability to interpret what is likely to be hip on the opposite side implies a reduction in the
preferences alignment across the two sides (formally, a reduction in ρv). In this case, information
about preferences on the opposite side contributes to lower profits and total welfare.
We should point out that providing agents with more information does not necessarily mean
improving their ability to predict the other side’s participation. To see this, assume that the true
stand-alone differentials are given by Vil = θi + εil, where εil is a taste shock capturing idiosyncratic
variation in the preferences of the side-i agents. Suppose agents do not observe Vil but, instead,
receive information summarized in the signal xil = θi + αεil + ηil, where ηil is Gaussian white noise.
Here α measures the degree of congruence between the agents’ true stand-alone differentials and their
estimated ones, while ηil is an error term. Information that reduces the variance of ηil increases the
agents’ ability to predict both their true preferences, Vil, as well as the preferences on the other side
of the market (insofar θj is correlated with θi). Instead, information that increases α may increase
the agents’ ability to understand their own preferences but at the cost of reducing their ability to
predict the participation of the other side.
More generally, because both the dispersion of the estimated stand-alone differentials and the
alignment in preferences across the two sides contribute to higher profits and because information
that increases the former may reduce the latter, platforms may face non-trivial trade-offs when it
comes to designing their communication strategies.
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5.2.3 Word of mouth and viral communications
Recent technological developments have provided platforms with many new opportunities for mar-
keting and communications. In addition to traditional promotion campaigns, platforms now use
online communities and social networks to promote their services through viral communication (see,
e.g., Aral and Walker (2011)). A concern is that platforms loose control over the content of such
viral communication (see, e.g., Godes et al (2005), and Aral, Dellarocas and Godes (2013)).
For our concerns, word of mouth is a form of information sharing that may mitigate the dispersion
of beliefs. Depending on the nature of the community, the type of dispersion concerned may vary. For
instance, a community restricted to one side may improve primarily that side’s agents understanding
of their own preferences, with little effect on these agents’ ability to predict preferences on the other
sides. In contrast, a community open to both sides, such as a forum designed to attract agents from
both sides of the market, or a viral advertising campaign on a social network that attracts users
from both sides (for instance, potential buyers and sellers of a C2C website) may lead to a better
understanding of features that appeal to both sides, although, in some cases, this may come at the
cost of reducing the dispersion of beliefs within a given side. Whether platforms should promote
one-sided or two-sided communities then crucially depends on the alignment in preferences across
the two sides, as indicated by the results above.
5.3 Post-launch disclosures
Following the launch of a new smartphone, or a new video-game console, the evolution of sales is
highly scrutinized and reported by the specialized press. Platforms themselves often report adoption
rates on both sides of the market. Such post-launch disclosures, when credible, provide agents with
information about the actual participation of the opposite side allowing them to adjust their behavior.
They differ from the pre-launch campaign discussed above whose role is to improve the agents’ ability
to use their own appreciation for the platforms’ products to predict participation decisions on the
opposite side of the market.
In this section we investigate how post-launch disclosures affect profits and welfare. Intuitively,
as end-users and developers obtain information in addition to their own valuation, we expect such
post-launch disclosures to improve the coordination of the two sides and to change the demand
elasticities.
To investigate the effects of such post-launch disclosures on profits in the simplest possible way,
we consider a dynamic extension in which agents can change platforms after receiving information
about the earlier participation decisions.32 We assume there are two periods, and allow agents to
switch platforms in the second period. We assume that switching costs are negligible and disregard
them. The cross-sectional distribution of stand-alone valuations is constant over the two periods.
32In this section, we focus on the effects of such policies on profits. That such policies contribute positively to welfare
is immediate given that they permit agents to better coordinate across sides.
25
Information is dispersed in the first period but agents observe the first-period aggregate participation
decisions prior to making their second-period decisions. For simplicity, we assume that preferences
are time-separable (i.e., the sum of the flow payoffs). Agents who do not change platform must still
renew their membership in the second period by paying to the platform a participation fee in the
second period.
To illustrate the key effects in the simplest possible way, we assume platforms maintain prices
constant over the two periods (the alternative case in which platforms adjust prices at the same
frequency at which agents revise their beliefs is examined in the Supplementary Material). To ease
the exposition, we maintain the assumptions of the Gaussian model but assume that agents face no
uncertainty about their own stand-alone valuations, i.e., Vil ≡ vil for all agents. The equilibrium
characterization in this section, however, does not depend on the distributions being Gaussian. What
is important is that, for any given price vector, there is a one-to-one mapping between the aggregate
state of the world θ and the realized demands. This property is guaranteed when network effects are
small. In particular, we assume that γ1 and γ2 are such that, for any state θ,
γ1γ2 <
1
4 maxx λθ1(x) maxx λ
θ
2(x)
, (22)
where λθi is the density of the true distribution Λ
θ
i of stand-alone differentials in state θ.
Because switching costs are negligible, given any collection of prices p = (pA1 , p
A
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2 ), the
period-1 demands expected by the two platforms continue to be given by QAi (vˆi) and Q
B
i (vˆi), with
the vector of thresholds vˆ = (vˆ1, vˆ2) given by (14). The observation of the aggregate period-1
participation decisions then perfectly reveals to each agent the aggregate state θ. The period-2
demands are then given by qAi (θ) = Λ
θ
i (v
θ
i ) and q
B
i (θ) = 1−Λθi (vθi ), with the thresholds vθ = (vθ1, vθ2)
solving33
vθi + γi − 2γiΛθj(vθj ) = pBi − pAi , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. (23)
Combining (14) with (23), we can express the period-2 participation thresholds as a deterministic
function of the period-1 participation thresholds, with the functions vθi (vˆ) implicitly given by the
(unique) solution to the system of equations given by
vθi = vˆi − 2γi
[
Mji (vˆj | vˆi)− Λθj(vθj )
]
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
This representation of the period-2 thresholds is convenient because it permits us to express the
platforms’ intertemporal expected demands
QAi (vˆ) = Q
A
i (vˆi) + Eθ
[
qAi (θ)
]
= Eθ
[
Λθi (vˆi) + Λ
θ
i (v
θ
i (vˆ))
]
= 2−QBi (vˆ)
as a function of the period-1 participation thresholds. The key difference with respect to the static
model is that the participation that each platform now expects from side i over the two periods
33As shown in Lemma 1 in the Appendix, the system of equations given by (23) admits a unique solution, for any θ,
when Condition (22) holds. Note that this latter condition is stronger than Condition Q in the previous section.
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depends not only on the side-i period-1 marginal consumer, vˆi, but also on the side-j’s period-1
marginal consumer, vˆj .
Following steps similar to those in the baseline model (see Part 1 in the proof of Proposition 8
in the Appendix), we then have that the equilibrium prices, along with the period-1 participation
thresholds they induce, must solve the following optimality conditions
pAi =
QAi (vˆ)
∂QAi (vˆ)/∂vi
− 2γj ∂Mij (vˆi | vˆj)
∂vi
QAj (vˆ)
∂QAi (vˆ)/∂vi
− 2γi∂Mji (vˆj | vˆi)
∂vi
QAi (vˆ)
∂QAi (vˆ)/∂vi
(24)
− pAj
∂QAj (vˆ)/∂vi
∂QAi (vˆ)/∂vi
,
along with (14). Similar conditions hold for platform B. The above pricing equations are qualitatively
similar to the ones in the baseline model, except for one important difference. After seeing the
participation decisions in the first period, agents learn the distribution of stand-alone differentials
and use such information in the second period to revise their decisions. When this is the case, it
is not possible for the platforms to adjust the prices so as to perfectly neutralize the effect of a
variation in the expected participation of one side on the expected participation of the opposite side
over both periods. In particular, changing the price on side i and adjusting the price on side j
so as to maintain the side-j’s period-1 participation constant does not guarantee that the side-j’s
period-2 participation also remains constant. This novel effect is captured by the last term in the
price equation (24), which is absent in the static benchmark.
Importantly, this novel effect has implications for equilibrium profits. To see this in the simplest
possible way, suppose that competition is symmetric, in the sense that the two platforms set the
same prices on each side and expect, on average, (a) an equal share of the market in each period and
(b) agents to favor in period one the platform for which their stand-alone valuation is the highest.
In this case, the above optimality conditions imply that, in equilibrium, prices are given by
p∗∗i =
1
∂QAi (0, 0)/∂vi
{
1− 2γj ∂Mij (0 | 0)
∂vi
− 2γi∂Mji (0 | 0)
∂vi
}
(25)
− p∗∗j
∂QAj (0, 0)/∂vi
∂QAi (0, 0)/∂vi
,
for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, where
∂QAi (0, 0)/∂vi = Eθ[λθi (0)] + Eθ[λθi (vθi (0, 0))∂vθi (0, 0)/∂vi]
and
∂QAj (0, 0)/∂vi = Eθ[λθj(vθj (0, 0))∂vθj (0, 0)/∂vi]
are the marginal variations in the two sides’ intertemporal demands triggered by a joint variation in
prices that leaves the side-j’s period-1 demands unchanged.
To understand how post-launch disclosures affect profits suppose that, instead, platforms do not
disclose at the end of the first period any information about the period-1 participation decisions.
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Apart from this change, the environment is the same as in the rest of this subsection. In particular,
agents must continue to choose which platform to join in each of the two periods. However, because
they receive no information at the end of the first period, in equilibrium, no agent changes platform
in the second period. That is, in the absence of any post-launch disclosure, vθi (vˆ) = vˆi, for all θ,
i = 1, 2, in which case the intertemporal demands are given by 2QAi (0) = 2Eθ
[
Λθi (0)
]
. It is then
immediate that, in the absence of post-launch disclosures, the equilibrium prices are same as in the
static benchmark in the previous section. In particular, when all players share a common prior, as
assumed in this section, the equilibrium prices without post-launch disclosure are given by
p∗i =
1
2[∂QAi (0)/∂vi]
{
1− 2γj ∂Mij (0 | 0)
∂vi
− 2γi∂Mji (0 | 0)
∂vi
}
, (26)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, with ∂QAi (0)/∂vi = Eθ[λθi (0)]. Comparing the equilibrium prices across the two
environments, we then obtain the following result:
Proposition 8. Suppose that competition is symmetric and that, in the absence of any disclo-
sure, platforms set positive prices on both sides of the market. (a) Post-launch disclosures in-
crease profits if, starting from the equilibrium prices without disclosure, joint variations in prices
across sides that boost the period-1 demand on one side leaving the period-1 demand on the op-
posite side constant increase each side’s demand in period two less than in period one; a suffi-
cient condition for this to happen is that di ≡ Eθ[λθi (vθi (0, 0))∂vθi (0, 0)/∂vi] − Eθ[λθi (0)] ≤ 0 and
cji ≡ Eθ[λθj(vθj (0, 0))∂vθj (0, 0)/∂vi] ≤ 0. (b) Post-launch disclosures decrease profits if the same joint
variations in prices as in part (a) above increase each side’s demand in period two more than in
period one.
Consider a market in which, in the absence of post-launch disclosures, platforms set positive
prices on both sides (recall that this is always the case when network effects are not too large, i.e.,
when γ1 and γ2 are small). Without loss of generality, take the perspective of platform A and observe
that joint variations in pA1 and p
A
2 that boost the period-1 demand on side i while leaving the period-1
demand on side j constant amount to an increase in the period-1 participation threshold vˆi for fixed
period-1 side-j threshold vˆj . In the absence of post-launch disclosures, because no new information
is revealed at the end of the first period, such joint price variations trigger an equal increase in
the side-i’s participation to platform A over the two periods equal to Eθ[λθi (0)], where the latter is
simply the mass of agents who are ex-ante expected to be indifferent between the two platforms.
Furthermore, by construction, such variations, on average, leave the side-j participation to platform
A unchanged in both periods.
Now consider the same joint price variations under post-launch disclosures. Because there are no
switching costs, the period-1 variation in each of the two side’s participation to platform A expected
by the platform is the same as in the absence of post-launch disclosures. This is not the case, for
period 2. Under post-launch disclosures, the platform expects a variation in the period-2 participation
by side i equal to Eθ[λθi (vθi (0, 0))∂vθi (0, 0)/∂vi] and a variation in the period-2 participation by side j
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equal to Eθ[λθj(vθj (0, 0))∂vθj (0, 0)/∂vi]. To understand, observe that λθi (vθi (0, 0)) is the mass of agents
who, in state θ, are indifferent between joining one platform or the other when the two platforms
set equal prices, whereas ∂vθi (0, 0)/∂vi is the variation in the side-i period-2 threshold triggered by a
marginal variation in the side-i period-1 threshold (equivalently, by a marginal variation in the side-i
period-1 demand). When the above period-2 variations are smaller than their period-1 counterparts,
the platform’s incentives to cut its side-i price are smaller under post-launch disclosures than in
their absence. As a result, in equilibrium, prices, and hence profits, are higher under post-launch
disclosures than in their absence.
The above conclusions are reversed when the variation in the period-2 demands expected by the
platform is larger than the variation in the period-1 demands, on both sides of the market. In this
case, post-launch disclosures contribute negatively to profits ex-ante.
To better appreciate how post-launch disclosures affect prices and profits, consider again the
Gaussian model. With post-launch disclosures, the equilibrium prices cannot be computed in closed
form, so we resort to numerical methods to illustrate the key findings (see also part 3 in the proof
of Proposition 8 for an illustration of how the conditions in Proposition 8 specialize to the Gaussian
model). Consider a market whose primitives are symmetric across sides. Specifically, assume each θi
is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and precision βθ, i = 1, 2, and let ρθ denote the
coefficient of linear correlation between θ1 and θ2. Given θ = (θ1, θ2), the stand-alone differential for
each agent l ∈ [0, 1] from each side i = 1, 2 is given by vil = θi+εil with each εil drawn independently
across agents and independently from θ from a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and precision
βε. Figures 1 and 2 plot the difference
∆ ≡ p∗∗1 + p∗∗2 − (p∗1 + p∗2)
in the sum of the equilibrium prices, with and without post-launch disclosures, as a function of the
intensity of the network effects γ = γ1 = γ2, for different levels of (ρθ, β
ε, βθ) . Note that, because
competition is symmetric, the difference in profits coincides with the difference in prices.
As the figures illustrate, prices are higher under post-launch disclosures, and the more so the larger
the network effects. When earlier participation decisions are observable, in later periods, agents
use the adoption rates in earlier periods, as opposed to their own appreciation for the platforms’
products, to form beliefs about the platforms’ ability to attract users in the subsequent periods.
This channel contributes to a reduction in the correlation between the agents’ own stand-alone
valuations and the expected network effects. Because such correlation contributes to a reduction in
the elasticity of the demands, through this channel, post-launch disclosures contribute to a higher
demand elasticity and hence to lower prices. At the same time, post-launch disclosures also permit
agents from different sides to better coordinate on which platform to join. More coordination softens
competition by making the two platforms more heterogenous ex-post and is thus akin to a higher
degree of horizontal differentiation, but originating in network effects. Through this second channel,
post-launch disclosures contribute to higher prices. In the Gaussian model, this second effect prevails,
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Figure 1: Price differential as a function of network effects (large uncertainty)
Figure 2: Price differential as a function of network effects (small uncertainty)
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Figure 3: Price differential as a function of preference alignment (large uncertainty)
making prices higher under post-launch disclosures. Clearly, the smaller the ex-ante uncertainty (i.e.,
the larger βθ is), the smaller the effect of post-launch disclosures on the expected variation in the
period-2 demands and hence the smaller the effect of such disclosures on the difference ∆ in the
equilibrium prices across the two environments, as one can see by comparing the graphs in Figure 1
with their counterparts in Figure 2. Likewise, the larger βε is, the smaller the idiosyncratic variation
in the agents’ appreciation for the two platforms and hence the stronger the benefit of letting the
agents coordinate across sides by observing the earlier participation decisions.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a similar pattern but from a different angle. They depict the relationship
between the price differential ∆ and the coefficient of linear correlation ρθ, for different specifications
of γ and βθ. They also decompose the effects of variations in ρθ on ∆ into the two forces identified
in Proposition 8, namely into di and cji. Recall that the terms di measure the difference in the
period-2 marginal demands (with and without post-launch disclosures) stemming from joint price
variations that leave the period-1 side-j demand constant. The terms cji, in contrast, measure the
analog differential in period-2 demand on side j.
In the Gaussian model, a higher ρθ implies a higher alignment in preferences across sides, for
fixed ex-ante dispersion of stand-alone differentials, βvi . When uncertainty is large (Figure 3), more
alignment in preferences unambiguously contributes to a smaller price differential ∆. While prices,
and hence profits, are always higher with post-launch disclosures than in their absence, the benefits
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Figure 4: Price differential as a function of preference alignment (small uncertainty)
of post-launch disclosures decline with the alignment of preferences across sides. Interestingly, when
ex-ante uncertainty is large and preferences are sufficiently aligned, the two forces identified in
Proposition 8 contribute in the opposite direction to the price differential ∆: joint variations in
prices that increase the side-i period-1 demand while leaving the side-j period-1 demand constant
contribute to a smaller increase in the side-i period-2 demand than in the absence of post-launch
disclosures but to a larger increase in the side-j period-2 demand (di < 0 but cji > 0, for large
ρθ). Furthermore, the larger ρθ, the larger di and cji, implying a stronger incentive to cut prices
under post-launch disclosures. The above effects are dampened when there is little uncertainty from
an ex-ante perspective, i.e., when βθ is large (Figure 4). Furthermore, in this case, the two forces
identified in Proposition 8 contribute both to higher prices under post-launch disclosures (both di
and cji are negative in this case). However, while the effect of the first channel, di, declines with the
alignment in preferences across sides, the effect of the second channel, cji, increases with ρθ.
To understand why the benefit of post-launch disclosures may decrease with the alignment in
preferences across sides, note that, on the one hand, more alignment contributes to a higher coefficient
of mutual forecastability Ω and hence to a smaller elasticity of the demands in the absence of post-
launch disclosures. Through this channel, more alignment contributes to a smaller differential ∆
and hence to a smaller benefit of post-launch disclosures. On the other hand, more alignment also
contributes to higher “tipping” ex-post and hence to a higher impact of post-launch disclosures on the
platforms’ differentiation. Through this second channel, more alignment contributes to a higher ∆.
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What Figures 3 and 4 reveal is that, in the Gaussian model, when the degree of ex-ante uncertainty
is large, the first channel tends to prevail, whereas the two channels tend to cancel each other out
when the ex-ante degree of uncertainty is small.
We conducted a large set of simulations and found that patters similar to the ones in the above
figures emerge across a variety of parameters’ specifications, including those for markets whose prim-
itives are asymmetric across sides (the results are available upon requests). Importantly, the above
results do not hinge on the agents learning perfectly the distribution of preferences by observing the
earlier participation decisions. The same conclusions obtain when the earlier participation decisions
are observed with noise, as is likely to be the case in most markets of interest. Finally note that the
above results have implications also for mature markets where the demand on each side fluctuates
over time as the result of shocks to the distribution of preferences. In such markets, platforms tend to
benefit from disclosing promptly variations in the actual participation of the two sides when network
effects are strong and preferences are not too aligned across sides.
6 Conclusions
The analysis delivers a few important lessons for platform markets. First, dispersed information
introduces correlation between the agents’ appreciations for a platform’s product and their beliefs
about the platform’s ability to attract users from other sides of the market. When preferences are
aligned across sides, such correlation contributes to a lower elasticity of the residual demands and
to higher equilibrium prices. Second, platforms benefit from aligning preferences across sides, for
example through design that favors product dimensions expected to be appreciated by both sides,
or the promotion of collaborative architectures that permit agents from multiple sides to shape the
platform’s product. Third, once preferences are aligned, platforms benefit from engaging in various
pre-launch campaigns whose role is to encourage agents to use their own appreciations to predict the
participation of the other sides. Such campaigns, however, are not guaranteed to favor consumers, for,
by softening competition, they permit platforms to charge higher prices. Fourth, in dynamic markets,
the benefits platforms derive from disclosing information about earlier participation decisions are
stronger the larger the network effects but may decline with the alignment in preferences across sides.
These results can help appreciate the importance platforms assign to the promotion of showrooms,
trials, forums, architectural design, and viral marketing campaigns at the early stages, when igniting
the market is essential to their survival.
In future work, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to richer dynamic environments
and investigate platforms’ incentives to shape the dynamics of individual and social learning. It
would also be interesting to accommodate for price discrimination and study how platforms grant
differential access to the participating agents from other sides of the market.34 Finally, it would be
34See Damiano and Li (2007), Gomes and Pavan (2016, 2017), and Veiga, White, and Weyl (2017) for models that
combine certain forms of price discrimination with heterogeneity in attractiveness. See also Ambrus and Argenziano
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interesting to introduce richer forms of preference heterogeneity and investigate the implications of
decreasing returns to scale to network effects.
One aspect of information management that we did not consider in this paper relates to platforms’
practice of artificially inflating agents’ beliefs about participation levels through the creation of fake
profiles (see, e.g., the discussion of Reddit, a social news aggregator, in Reillier and Reillier, 2017).
We plan to examine this extension as well as the other avenues indicated above in future research.
References
[1] van Alstyne, M., G. Parker, and S. Choudary (2016): ”Pipelines, Platforms, and the New Rules
of Strategy,” Harvard Business Review. Vol. 94, Issue 4.
[2] Ambrus, A., Calvano E. and M. Reisinger (2013): ”Either or Both Competition: A Two-sided
Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships,” Working Paper, Duke University.
[3] Ambrus, A. and R. Argenziano (2009): ”Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets,” Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1) , 17-52.
[4] Amelio A. and B. Jullien (2012): ”Tying and Freebies in Two-sided Markets,” International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(5), 436-446.
[5] Anderson, S. and R. Renault (2006): ”Advertising Content,” American Economic Review 96,(1),
93-113.
[6] Anderson, S. and R. Renault (2009): ”Comparative Advertising: Disclosing Horizontal Match
Information,” RAND Journal of Economics, 40,(3), 558-581.
[7] Aral, S., Dellarocas, C., & Godes, D. (2013): ”Introduction to the special issue—social media
and business transformation: a framework for research,” Information Systems Research, 24(1),
3-13.
[8] Aral, S., & Walker, D. (2011): ”Creating social contagion through viral product design: A
randomized trial of peer influence in networks,” Management science, 57(9), 1623-1639.
[9] Argenziano, R. (2008): ”Differentiated Networks: Equilibrium and Efficiency” Rand Journal of
Economics 39, 747–769.
[10] Armstrong, M. (2006): ”Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Rand Journal of Economics 37,
668–691.
(2009) for a model with heterogenous network effects in which platforms discriminate by offering multiple networks.
34
[11] Armstrong, M. and J. Wright (2007): ”Two-Sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks, and Ex-
clusive Contracts,” Economic Theory 32, 353-380.
[12] Arthur, B. W. (1996): ”Increasing Returns and the New World of Business,” Harvard Business
Review 74 (4): 100-109.
[13] Athey, S., E. Calvano and J.S. Gans (2012): ”The Impact of the Internet on Advertising Markets
for News Media,”Working Paper, Harvard University.
[14] Bergemann, D. and A. Bonatti (2011): ”Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for
Offline versus Online Media,” RAND Journal of Economics, 42, 417-443.
[15] Boudreau, K. and A. Hagiu, (2009): ”Platform Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms as Regulators,”
in Platforms, Markets and Innovation, edited by A. Gawer, Edward Elgar Publishing.
[16] Cabral L. (2011): ”Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects”, Review of Economic
Studies 78 (1): 83-111.
[17] Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2001): ”Competing Cybermediaries,” European Economic Review
(Papers & Proceedings) 45, 797-808.
[18] Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2003): ”Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service
Providers,” Rand Journal of Economics, 34, 309-328.
[19] Castillo, J.C., D. Knoepfle, and G. Weyl: ”Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase” mimeo
Microsoft Research.
[20] Carlsson, H., and E. Van Damme (1993): ”Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,” Econo-
metrica 61, 989-1018.
[21] Chellappa, R., and R. Mukherjee (2017): ”Platform Preannouncement Strategies: The Strategic
Role of Information in Two-Sided Markets Competition,” mimeo Emory University.
[22] Damiano, E. and H. Li (2007): ”Price Discrimination and Efficient Matching,” Economic The-
ory, Vol. 30, 243-263.
[23] Edelman, B. G. (2015): ”How to Launch Your Digital Platform: A Playbook for Strategists.”
Harvard Business Review 93(4), 90–97.
[24] Evans, D. and R. Schmalensee (2015): ”Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Plat-
forms,” Harvard Business Review Press.
[25] Farrell, J. and P. Klemperer (2006): ”Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching
Costs and Network Effects,” in Armstrong, M. and Porter, R. (eds) Handbook of Industrial
Organization, Vol. 3 (North-Holland), 1967–2072.
35
[26] Gallaway, B. (2013): ”Confusion Ruled the Day at Microsoft’s Xbox One Reveal Event,”
https://www.wired.com/2013/2005/xbox-one-hands-on/.
[27] Gaudeul, A. (2010): ”Software Marketing on the Internet: the Use of Samples and Repositories,”
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 19(3), 259-281.
[28] Godes, D., Mayzlin, D., Chen, Y., Das, S., Dellarocas, C., Pfeiffer, B., Libai, B., Sen, S., Shi,
M. and P. Verlegh (2005): ”The Firm’s Management of Social Interactions,” Marketing Letters,
16(3-4), pp.415-428.
[29] Gomes, R. and A. Pavan (2016): ”Many-To-Many Matching and Price Discrimination,” Theo-
retical Economics, 11, 1005–1052.
[30] Gomes, R. and A. Pavan (2017): ”Price Customization and Targeting in Many-to-Many match-
ing markets,” mimeo Northwestern University and Toulouse School of Economics.
[31] Halaburda, H. and Y. Yehezkel (2013): ”Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information,”
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(3): 22-68.
[32] Hagiu, A. (2006): ”Optimal Pricing and Commitment in Two-Sided Markets,” The RAND
Journal of Economics 37(3), 720–737.
[33] Hagiu, A. (2009): ”Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures,” Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy 18, 1011-1043.
[34] Hagiu, A. and H. Halaburda (2014): ”Information and Two-sided Platform Profits,” Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 34(C), 25-35.
[35] Haruvy, E. and A. Prasad (2005): ”Freeware as a Competitive Deterrent,” Information Eco-
nomics and Policy, 17(4), pp.513-534.
[36] Johnson, J. and D. Myatt (2006): ”On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and
Product Design” American Economic Review 96,(3), 756-784
[37] Jullien, B. (2007): ”Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediation,” in G. Illing and M.
Peitz (eds.), Industrial Organization and the Digital Economy, MIT Press.
[38] Katz M., and C.Shapiro (1985): ”Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility,”
American Economic Review, 75, 424–440.
[39] Lee, R. S. (2013): ”Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-sided Markets,”
American Economic Review 103(7), 2960-3000.
[40] Lee, Y., and O’Connor, G. C. (2003): ”New product launch strategy for network effects prod-
ucts,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 31(3), 241-255.
36
[41] Lewis, T. and D. E. M. Sappington (1994): ”Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrim-
ination,” International Economic Review 35, 309-327.
[42] Mitchell, M. and A. Skrzypacz (2006): ”Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Share,”
Economic Theory, 29, 621–648.
[43] Morris, S. and H.S. Shin (2003): ”Global Games—Theory and Applications,” in Advances in
Economics and Econometrics, 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society (M. Dewatripont,
L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky, eds.), Cambridge University Press.
[44] Pisano, G. P. and R. Verganti (2008), ”Which Kind of Collaboration is Right for You,” Harvard
Business Review, 86(12), 78-86.
[45] Reillier, L. C., and Reillier, B. (2017). Platform Strategy: How to Unlock the Power of Com-
munities and Networks to Grow Your Business. Taylor & Francis.
[46] Rochet, J.C. and J. Tirole (2003): ”Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Journal of
the European Economic Association 1, 990-1029.
[47] Rochet, J.C. and J. Tirole (2006): ”Two-Sided Markets: a Progress Report,” The RAND Journal
of Economics 37, 645-667.
[48] Rysman, M. (2009): ”The Economics of Two-Sided Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspective
23(3), 125-143.
[49] Sheshinski, E.(1976: ”Price, Quality and Quantity Regulation in Monopoly Situations,” Eco-
nomica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(17), 127-37.
[50] Spence, A.M. (1975): ”Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2),
417–29.
[51] Sterlicchi, J. (2013): ”Nintendo’s Wii console captures new game market,”
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/oct/2010/usnews.internationalnews.
[52] Tan, G. and J. Zhou (2017): ”Price Competition in Multi-Sided Markets,” mimeo University of
Southern California and National University of Singapore.
[53] Veiga, A. White, A. and E. G. Weyl (2017): ”Multidimensional Platform Design,” American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 107(5).
[54] Weyl, E. G. (2010): ”A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms,” American Economic Review,
100(4): 1642–72.
[55] Whinston, M. (1990): ”Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,” American Economic Review 80(4),
837-859.
37
[56] White, A. and E. G. Weyl (2017) ”Insulated Platform Competition”, mimeo Microsoft Research.
7 Appendix
Benchmarks and monopoly
Proof of Proposition 1. Under the profit-maximizing prices, the expected participation rates Qki ,
i = 1, 2, k = A,B, must satisfy the familiar first-order conditions
pki +Qi
∂pki
∂Qi
∣∣∣∣
p−ki =const
= 0.
Combining the above optimality conditions with the fact that, given any vector of prices, the
demands are given by Qki (vˆi), i = 1, 2, k = A,B, with vˆi = p
B
i − pAi then gives the result. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1. Suppose information is complete and35
γ1γ2 <
1
4 maxx λθ1(x) maxx λ
θ
2(x)
. (27)
For any vector of prices p = (pA1 , p
A
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2 ), there exists one and only one continuation equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1. We establish the result by showing that, for any p = (pA1 , p
A
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2 ),
there exists one, and only one, solution to the system of equations given by (2). This in turn
implies existence and uniqueness of continuation equilibria in monotone strategies. The result in
the lemma then follows from the fact that the unique monotone continuation equilibrium is also
the unique continuation strategy profile surviving iterated deletion of interim strictly dominated
strategies (that is, it is the unique rationalizable profile).
Fix the prices p = (pA1 , p
A
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2 ) ∈ R4 and observe that, under complete information, Condition
(2) is equivalent to vˆi + γi
[
1− 2Λθj(vˆj)
]
= pBi − pAi , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
For any vˆj ∈ R, j = 1, 2, the gross payoff differential that an agent from side i 6= j with differential
in stand-alone valuations vi derives from joining platform B relative to joining platform A, when all
agents from side j follow a cut-off strategy with cutoff vˆj
36 is strictly increasing in vi and equal to
vi +γi
[
1− 2Λθj(vˆj)
]
. Note that the term 1− 2Λθj(vˆj) = qBj − qAj is the differential between the side-j
participation to platform B and the side-j participation to platform A. This means that, given any
vˆj , there exists one and only one solution vˆi = ri(vˆj) to the equation p
B
i −pAi = vˆi+γi
[
1− 2Λθj(vˆj)
]
.
35Recall that λθi (vi) is the density of the side-i cumulative marginal distribution Λ
θ
i (vi) of stand-alone differentials
in state θ.
36That is, join platform A when vjl < vˆj and join platform B when vjl > vˆj .
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Now consider the function y(vj) ≡ vj + γj
[
1− 2Λθi (ri(vj))
]
. Note that y(vj) is the gross payoff
differential between joining platform B and joining platform A for an agent from side j with differ-
ential in stand-alone valuations equal to vj , when all agents from side i 6= j follow a cut-off strategy
with cut-off equal to ri(vj). The function y(vj) is differentiable with derivative
y′(vj) = 1− 2γjλθi (ri(vj))r′i(vj) = 1− 4γiγjλθi (ri(vj))λθj(vj).
Condition (27) guarantees that y′(vj) > 0 for all vj ∈ R. Because limvj→−∞ y(vj) = −∞ and
limvj→+∞ y(vj) = +∞, we then have that a solution to the equation y(vj) = pBj − pAj exists and is
unique. In turn, this implies existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system of equations given
by (2). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. For any vector of participation rates (QB1 , Q
B
2 ), the prices that platform
B must set to implement the participation rates QB1 and Q
B
2 are given by
pBi = p
A
i + vˆi + 2γiQ
B
j − γi, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
with vˆ1 and vˆ1 implicitly defined by Q
B
i (vˆi) = Q
B
i , i = 1, 2. Platform B’s profits (expressed as a
function of the participation rates (QB1 , Q
B
2 )) are thus equal to
ΠB =
∑
i,j=1,2,j 6=i
[
pAi + vˆi + 2γiQ
B
j − γi
]
QBi .
The participation rates that maximize platform B’s profits must thus solve the following first-order
conditions
pBi −
QBi
|dQBi (vˆi)/dvi|
+ 2γjQ
B
j = 0. (28)
Similar conditions apply to platform A. Expressing the optimality conditions in (28) in terms of
prices and participation thresholds then permits us to establish the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The result follows from differentiating the profit function in (10) and
then using (8). Q.E.D.
Duopoly analysis
Lemma 2. Suppose information is dispersed and Conditions (M) and (Q) hold. For any vector of
prices p = (pA1 , p
A
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2 ), there exists one and only one solution to the system of equations given by
(14). In every continuation equilibrium, all agents from side i = 1, 2 whose differential in stand-alone
valuations exceeds vˆi join platform B, whereas all agents whose differential in stand-alone valuation
is less than vˆi join platform A, where (vˆ1, vˆ2) is the unique solution to (14).
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof parallels that for Lemma 1 above. First observe that, when
Condition (M) holds, for any vj ∈ R, the gross payoff differential that an agent from side i 6= j with
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differential in stand-alone valuations equal to vi derives from joining platform B relative to joining
platform A, when all agents from side j follow a cut-off strategy with cutoff vj is strictly increasing
in vi and equal to vi + γi [1− 2Mji (vj |vi)] . The intermediate-value and implicit-function theorems
then imply that, given the prices p = (pA1 , p
A
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2 ), for any vj ∈ R, there exists one and only one
solution vi = ζi(vj) to the equation p
B
i − pAi = vi + γi [1− 2Mji (vj |vi)] with ζi(vj) satisfying
ζ ′i(vj) =
2γi
∂Mji(vj |ζi(vj))
∂vj
1− 2γi ∂Mji(vj |ζi(vj))∂vi
. (29)
Note that the denominator in (29) is strictly positive under Condition (M) while the nominator is
also positive given that ∂Mji (vj |ζi(vj)) /∂vj is simply the density of the posterior beliefs of any agent
from side i with stand-alone differential equal to ζi(vj).
Next, let zj(vj) ≡ vj +γj [1− 2Mij (ζi(vj)|vj)] denote the gross payoff differential between joining
platform B and joining platform A for an agent from side j with differential in stand-alone valuations
equal to vj , when all agents from side i 6= j follow a cut-off strategy with cut-off equal to ζi(vj). The
function zj(vj) is differentiable with derivative equal to
z′j(vj) = 1− 2γj
{
∂Mij (ζi(vj)|vj)
∂vi
ζ ′i(vj) +
∂Mij (ζi(vj)|vj)
∂vj
}
= 1− 2γj ∂Mij (ζi(vj)|vj)
∂vj
−
 4
1− 2γi ∂Mji(vj |ζi(vj))∂vi
 γiγj ∂Mij (ζi(vj)|vj)
∂vi
∂Mji (vj |ζi(vj))
∂vj
.
Together, Conditions (M) and (Q) imply that the function zj(vj) is strictly increasing. Because
limvj→−∞ zj(vj) = −∞ and limvj→+∞ zj(vj) = +∞, we then have that a solution to the equation
zj(vj) = p
B
j −pAj exists and is unique. This in turn implies that there exists one and only one solution
to the system of equations given by (14). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Given the prices
(
pA1 , p
A
2
)
set by platform A, and given the bijective
relationship between
(
pB1 , p
B
2
)
and (vˆ1, vˆ2) given by (14), platform B’s prices
(
pB1 , p
B
2
)
constitute a
best-response to
(
pA1 , p
A
2
)
if, and only if, the participation thresholds (vˆ1, vˆ2) they induce solve the
following problem:
max
(v1,v2)
ΠˆB (v1, v2) ≡
∑
i,j=1,2,j 6=i
[
pAi + vi + γi − 2γiMji (vj | vi)
]
QBi (vi).
The thresholds (vˆ1, vˆ2) that maximize platform B’s profits must thus be a solution to the first-order
conditions given by
− [pAi + vˆi − 2γiMji (vˆj | vˆi) + γi] ∣∣∣∣dQBi (vˆi)dvi
∣∣∣∣+QBi (vi)− 2γi∂Mji (vˆj | vˆi)∂vi QBi (vi)
−2γj ∂Mij (vˆi | vˆj)
∂vi
QBj (vj) = 0.
40
The result then follows from combining the above optimality conditions with their analogs for plat-
form A and using (14). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. When competition is symmetric, the participation thresholds are given
by vˆ1 = vˆ2 = 0 (This follows directly from property (b) in the definition of symmetric competition).
From (14), and using property (a) in the definition of symmetric competition, we then have that
Mji (0 | 0) = 1/2, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. That the platforms expect to share the market evenly then
implies that Qki (0) = 1/2, k = A,B, i = 1, 2. From (15), we then have that the equilibrium prices
must satisfy
pki =
1
2|dQki (0)/dvi|
− γi
 ∂Mji(0|0)∂vi
|dQki (0)/dvi|
− γj
 ∂Mij(0|0)∂vi
|dQki (0)/dvi|
 , k = A,B. (30)
For the platforms’ prices to coincide, it must then be that
1
|dQAi (0)/dvi|
(
1
2
− γi∂Mji (0 | 0)
∂vi
− γj ∂Mij (0 | 0)
∂vi
)
=
1
|dQBi (0)/dvi|
(
1
2
− γi∂Mji (0 | 0)
∂vi
− γj ∂Mij (0 | 0)
∂vi
)
Clearly, it cannot be that
1
2
− γi∂Mji (0 | 0)
∂vi
− γj ∂Mij (0 | 0)
∂vi
= 0,
for otherwise the equilibrium prices would be equal to zero on each side, and this is obviously
inconsistent with the optimality of the platforms’ strategies. We thus conclude that there must
exist ψi(0) ∈ R, i = 1, 2, such that |dQki (0)/dvi| = ψi(0), i = 1, 2, k = A,B. Together, the above
properties imply that the equilibrium prices must satisfy (16). The other statements in the corollary
follow directly from the equilibrium price formulas. Q.E.D.
Information management
Proof of Proposition 5. The formulas for the equilibrium prices in (19) follow directly from Corol-
lary 1 by noting that ψi(0) =
√
βvi φ(0), ∂Mji (0 | 0) /∂vi = −Ω
√
βvi φ(0), and ∂Mij (0 | 0) /∂vi =√
1 + Ω2
√
βvi φ(0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. We first establish the effect of variations in ρv on equilibrium profits
and then their effect on welfare and consumer surplus.
Equilibrium profits. From (20), equilibrium profits are increasing in the coefficient of mutual fore-
castability Ω. That equilibrium profits increase with ρv follows from the fact that Ω = ρv/
√
1− ρ2v
is increasing in ρv.
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Total welfare. Let Gθi denote the joint distribution of (Vi, vi) in state θ, with marginals given by
GθiV and G
θ
iv, i = 1, 2. Recall that the aggregate state is parametrized by a vector θ = (θ1, θ2) drawn
from a distribution Fθ. Given θ, each pair (Vil, vil), i = 1, 2, l ∈ [0, 1] is drawn independently across
agents from Gθi .
In equilibrium, each agent l from each side i = 1, 2, joins platform A when vil < 0 and platform
B when vil > 0. This means that total ex-ante welfare is equal to W = E[w(θ)], where
w(θ) ≡ ∑i,j=1,2, j 6=i ∫ 0vi=−∞ ∫ Vi=+∞Vi=−∞ {si − Vi2 + γiqAj (θ)} dGθi (Vi, vi)
+
∑
i,j=1,2, j 6=i
∫ +∞
vi=0
∫ Vi=+∞
Vi=−∞
{
si +
Vi
2 + γiq
B
j (θ)
}
dGθi (Vi, vi),
(31)
with
qAj (θ) = G
θ
jx(0) = 1− qBj (θ)
denoting the measure of agents from side j who join platform A.
Now observe that
w(θ) =
∑
i=1,2
∫ Vi=+∞
Vi=−∞
{
si − Vi
2
}
dGθiV (Vi) +
∑
i=1,2
∫ +∞
vi=0
∫ Vi=+∞
Vi=−∞
VidG
θ
i (Vi, vi)
+
∑
i,j=1,2 j 6=i
γiG
θ
iv(0)G
θ
jv(0) +
∑
i,j=1,2 j 6=i
γi[1−Gθiv(0)][1−Gθjv(0)].
Averaging over θ, and using the law of iterated expectations, we then have that
W = K +
∑
i=1,2
E [VilI(vil > 0)] + (γ1 + γ2)Pr (v1 · v2 ≥ 0) , (32)
where
K =
∑
i=1,2
E
[
si − Vi
2
]
.
In the Gaussian case,
Pr(v1 ≥ 0, v2 ≥ 0) = Pr(v1 < 0, v2 < 0) = 1
4
+
1
2pi
arcsin(ρv) =
1
4
+ φ2(0)arcsin(ρv)
and hence
Pr (v1 · v2 ≥ 0) = 1
2
+ 2φ2(0)arcsin(ρv).
Also observe that
∂arcsin(ρv)
∂ρv
=
1√
1− ρ2v
=
Ω
ρv
≥ 0. (33)
The first two terms in (32) are invariant in ρv. Hence, total welfare also increases with ρv.
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Consumer surplus. Finally, consider the effects of variations in ρv on consumer surplus. Observe
that CS = W − 2Π∗. Using the fact that
Ω−
√
1 + Ω2 =
ρv − 1√
1− ρ2v
we have that
∂(2Π∗)
∂ρv
= (γ1 + γ2)
∂
∂ρv
(
ρv − 1√
1− ρ2v
)
and hence that
∂CS
∂ρv
=
∂W
∂ρv
− ∂(2Π
∗)
∂ρv
= 2(γ1 + γ2)φ
2(0)
1√
1− ρ2v
− (γ1 + γ2) ∂
∂ρv
(
ρv − 1√
1− ρ2v
)
It follows that
∂CS
∂ρv
=
(γ1 + γ2)√
1− ρ2v
{
2φ2(0)− 1
1 + ρv
}
.
Because 2φ2(0) = 1/pi and pi > 1 + ρv, we conclude that CS is decreasing in ρv. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. We establish the result by considering separately the effects of such
policies on equilibrium profits, welfare, and consumer surplus.
Profits. Recall that equilibrium profits are increasing in Ω. When preferences are aligned (i.e.,
ρv > 0), an increase in the agents’ ability to predict participation decisions on the opposite side
(formally, an increase in |Ω|) then implies an increase in Ω and hence higher profits. When, instead,
preferences are misaligned (i.e., ρv < 0), an increase in |Ω| implies a reduction of Ω and hence lower
profits.
Welfare. Next, consider the effects of such policies on total welfare. Recall that the latter is given
by the formula in (32). Note that policies that leave unchanged both the prior distribution from
which the true stand-alone valuations Vi are drawn and the ex-ante distribution of the estimated
stand-alone differentials vi also leave the first two terms in (32) unchanged. To see this, observe that
Cov(Vi, vi) = 1/β
v
i (to see this, just note that Vi = vi + error where, given vi, error is orthogonal to
Vi ). Hence the joint distribution of (Vi, vi) is unaffected by such variations and hence so is∑
i=1,2
E
[
si − Vi
2
]
+
∑
i=1,2
E [VilI(vil > 0)] .
From (32), it is then immediate that policies that increase the agents’ ability to predict participation
decisions on the other side of the market increase welfare if, and, only if, they increase arcsin(ρv).
Then use (33) to observe that arcsin(ρv) is increasing in ρv, and hence in Ω. The effects of such
policies on welfare are thus the same as the effects of the same policies on equilibrium profits.
Consumer surplus. Lastly, consider the effects of such policies on consumer surplus. From the
same derivations as in the proof of Proposition 6,
∂CS
∂ρv
=
(γ1 + γ2)√
1− ρ2v
{
1
pi
− 1
1 + ρv
}
< 0.
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Hence, the effects of such policies on consumer surplus are of opposite sign than the effects of such
policies on profits and total welfare. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is in three parts. Part 1 establishes that the equilibrium
prices must satisfy the optimality conditions in (24). Part 2 establishes the comparisons of equilibrium
prices across the two environments considered in the proposition. Part 3 shows how the conditions
in the proposition specialize in the Gaussian model.
Part 1. Fix the prices (pB1 , p
B
2 ) set by platform B. Platform A’s expected profits, expressed as a
function of the period-1 participation thresholds they induce, are given by
ΠA(vˆ1, vˆ2) =
∑
i,j=1,2, j 6=i
[
pBi − vˆi + 2γiMji (vˆj | vˆi)− γi
]
QAi (vˆ1, vˆ2).
The best response by platform A to platform B’s prices (pB1 , p
B
2 ) then consists in inducing period-1
thresholds (vˆ1, vˆ2) that solve the following optimality conditions
[
pBi − vˆi + 2γiMji (vˆj | vˆi)− γi
] ∂QAi (vˆ1, vˆ2)
∂vi
−
[
1− 2γi∂Mji (vˆj | vˆi)
∂vi
]
QAi (vˆ1, vˆ2)
+2γj
∂Mij (vˆi | vˆj)
∂vi
QAj (vˆ1, vˆ2) +
[
pBj − vˆj + 2γjMij (vˆi | vˆj)− γj
] ∂QAj (vˆ1, vˆ2)
∂vi
= 0.
Replacing pAi = p
B
i − vˆi + 2γiMji (vˆj | vˆi) − γi and pAj = pBj − vˆj + 2γjMij (vˆi | vˆj) − γj into the
above optimality conditions and rearranging terms, we obtain (24). Clearly, similar conditions hold
for platform B.
Part 2. When competition is symmetric, the equilibrium prices under post-launch disclosures are
given by
p∗∗i =
1
∂QAi (0, 0)/∂vi
{
1− 2γj ∂Mij (0 | 0)
∂vi
− 2γi∂Mji (0 | 0)
∂vi
}
− p∗∗j
∂QAj (0, 0)/∂vi
∂QAi (0, 0)/∂vi
(34)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, where
∂QAi (0, 0)/∂vi = Eθ
[
λθi (0) + λ
θ
i (v
θ
i (0, 0))
∂vθi (0, 0)
∂vi
]
, (35)
and
∂QAj (0, 0)/∂vi = Eθ
[
λθj(v
θ
j (0, 0))
∂vθj (0, 0)
∂vi
]
. (36)
In the absence of disclosure, instead, the equilibrium prices are given by
p∗i =
1
2
[
∂QAi (0)/∂vi
] {1− 2γj ∂Mij (0 | 0)
∂vi
− 2γi∂Mji (0 | 0)
∂vi
}
(37)
i = 1, 2, where ∂QAi (0)/∂vi = ψi(0) = Eθ
[
λθi (0)
]
.
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Because the expected intertemporal demands are the same with and without post-launch disclo-
sures, equilibrium profits are higher (alternatively, lower) with post-launch disclosures if p∗∗1 + p∗∗2 ≥
p∗1 + p∗2 (alternatively, if p∗∗1 + p∗∗2 ≤ p∗1 + p∗2).
From (34) and (37), it is then evident that, when, in the absence of post-launch disclosures,
platforms set positive prices on both sides of the market (i.e., when p∗1, p∗2 ≥ 0), equilibrium prices on
both sides are higher under post-launch disclosures than in their absence when, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
∂QAi (0, 0)/∂vi ≤ 2
[
∂QAi (0)/∂vi
]
and ∂QAj (0, 0)/∂vi ≤ 0, or, equivalently, when
di ≡ Eθ
[
λθi (v
θ
i (0, 0))
∂vθi (0, 0)
∂vi
]
− Eθ
[
λθi (0)
]
≤ 0
and cji ≡ Eθ
[
λθj(v
θ
j (0, 0))
∂vθj (0,0)
∂vi
]
≤ 0 (strictly, when one of the above two inequalities is strict).
Symmetrically, when p∗1, p∗2 ≥ 0, equilibrium prices on both sides of the market are lower under
post-launch disclosures if, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, di ≥ 0 and cji ≥ 0.
Part 3. To show how the sufficient conditions in the proposition specialize in the Gaussian model,
we first need to express the thresholds vθi (vˆ1, vˆ2) as a function of the primitive parameters. To do
this, recall that, for any θ, any pair of period-1 thresholds (vˆ1, vˆ2), the associated period-2 thresholds
are given by
vθi (vˆ1, vˆ2) = vˆi − 2γi
[
Mji (vˆj | vˆi)− Λθj(vθj (vˆ1, vˆ2))
]
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
We thus have that
∂vθi
∂vi
= 1− 2γi ∂
∂vi
Mji (vˆj | vˆi) + 2γiλθj(vθj )
∂vθj
∂vi
,
and
∂vθj
∂vi
= −2γj ∂
∂vi
Mij (vˆi | vˆj) + 2γjλθi (vθi )
∂vθi
∂vi
,
where we dropped (vˆ1, vˆ2) from the arguments of the period-2 threshold functions v
θ
i and v
θ
j to ease
the notation. From the above two conditions, we obtain that
∂vθi
∂vi
=
1− 2γi ∂∂viMji (vˆj | vˆi)− 4γ1γ2λθj(vθj ) ∂∂viMij (vˆi | vˆj)
1− 4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
and
∂vθj
∂vi
=
2γjλ
θ
i (v
θ
i )
(
1− 2γi ∂∂viMji (vˆj | vˆi)
)
− 2γj ∂∂viMij (vˆi | vˆj)
1− 4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
.
Replacing the above derivatives into the formulas for di and cji, we obtain that
di =
(
1− 2γi ∂∂viMji (0 | 0)
)
Eθ
[
λθi (v
θ
i )
1−4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
]
−4γ1γ2 ∂∂viMij (0 | 0)Eθ
[
λθ1(v
θ
1)λ
θ
2(v
θ
2)
1−4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
]
− ψi(0)
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and
cji = 2γj
(
1− 2γi ∂∂viMji (0 | 0)
)
Eθ
[
λθ1(v
θ
1)λ
θ
2(v
θ
2)
1−4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
]
−2γj ∂∂viMij (0 | 0)Eθ
[
λθj (v
θ
j )
1−4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
]
.
Now recall that, in the Gaussian case, ψi(0) =
√
βvi φ(0), ∂Mji (0 | 0) /∂vi = −Ω
√
βvi φ(0), and
∂Mij (0 | 0) /∂vi =
√
1 + Ω2
√
βvi φ(0). Replacing these formulas into the expressions for di and cji
above, we obtain that
di =
(
1 + 2γiΩ
√
βvi φ (0)
)
Eθ
[
λθi (v
θ
i )
1−4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
]
−4γ1γ2
√
1 + Ω2
√
βvi φ(0)Eθ
[
λθ1(v
θ
1)λ
θ
2(v
θ
2)
1−4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
]
−√βvi φ(0)
and
cji = 2γj
(
1 + 2γiΩ
√
βvi φ (0)
)
Eθ
[
λθ1(v
θ
1)λ
θ
2(v
θ
2)
1−4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
]
−2γj
√
1 + Ω2
√
βvi φ(0)Eθ
[
λθj (v
θ
j )
1−4γ1γ2λθ1(vθ1)λθ2(vθ2)
]
.
Q.E.D.
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Table 1: Notation summary
symbol description
k = A,B platforms
i, j = 1, 2 sides
l ∈ [0, 1] identity of agents on one side
vkil stand-alone valuation for platform k of agent l from side i
γi intensity of network effects on side i
qki mass of agents from side i joining platform k
pki price charged by platform k on side i
vil ≡ vBil − vAil ; differential in stand-alone valuations
QAi (v) measure of agents from side i with vil ≤ v expected by platform A
QBi (v) measure of agents from side i with vil ≥ v expected by platform B
Mji(vj | vi) measure of agents from side j with vjl ≤ vj as expected by any side-i agent with vil = vi
vˆi stand-alone value differential of marginal agent from side i
Table 2: Common prior
symbol description
θ aggregate state
Fθ CDF of θ
Λθi CDF of stand-alone differentials on side i in state θ
λθi PDF of stand-alone differentials on side i in state θ
Table 3: Gaussian structure
symbol description
Vil ≡ V Bil − V Ail differential in stand alone valuations
xil private signal of agent l from side i
vil ≡ vBil − vAil = E [Vil | xil] estimated stand-alone differential of agent l from side i
ρv ≡ corr(vil, vjl′) correlation between estimated stand-alone differentials
of any pair of agents from opposite sides
Ω ≡ ρV√
1−ρ2V
coefficient of mutual forecastability
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